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INTRODUCTION
Purpose
On August 1, 1950 the operations of the first compulsory
wheat pool, conducted under the auspices of the Canadian Wheat
Board, an agenoy of the Canadian Government, were completed.
This pool was an attempt at centralised marketing of the entire
Western Canadian wheat crop. Ostensibly the main reason for
this scheme was to secure for the farmer a fair and stable
price for his wheat crop.
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the chain of events
which, through the years, culminated in the government estab-
lishing the Canadian Wneat Board and vesting in that agency
monopoly power in the marketing of wheat grown in Western Cana-
da.
The extension of the activity of the present Wheat Board
from that exercised in Its beginning in 1935 to that indicated
above was not accomplished without considerable controversy.
The arguments which have been presented In support of the Wheat
Board and its various activities will be compared with the argu-
ments of those opposed to the Board. It Is hoped that this com-
parison will clarify the issue, setting out both the weaknesses
of the Wheat Board pool system and also the contributions which
the latter has made to Canadian grain marketing.
It is also the purpose of this thesis to set out some
points which were brought to view while considering the
period from 1917 to tho present and which are significant to
any future wheat marketing policy for Canada* These points
consist mainly of ideas expressed by individuals and organi-
zations concerning marketing policy.
Scope
The marketing history was reviewed from the date of the
first appearance of government activity, June 11, 1917, when
the Board of Grain Supervisors was appointed by the Government
of Canada for the purpose of gathering wheat supplies for the
Allies* The activities of this Board together with the ideas
which were conceived regarding group selling are important.
The organisation of cooperative wheat pools was the direct re-
sult of the experiment in group selling of wheat through a
government agency, and was stimulated by declining prices fol-
lowing World War I.
Through the activities of the cooperative wheat pools
formed at this time and their imprudent selling policies, the
government was drawn once more into the wheat marketing picture.
In 1935 a new Wheat Board was formed. A complete review of the
activities of this organization, which is still in existence,
is given*
Review of the Literature
The moat useful piece of literature available on the
Canadian Wheat Board is a pamphlet reprinted from the Canada
Year Book (1939 and 1947 editions). The basic article was
prepared by Dr. T. W. Grlndley and additions were made later
by the staff of the Canadian V.heat Board. The pamphlet is
available from the King's Printer, Ottawa. This pamphlet
together with the annual reports of the Canadian Wheat Board
contains a complete record of the business transactions of
the Board from 1935 to 1950.
A complete history of the development of the wheat mar-
keting problem up to 1938 is presented in the Report of the
Royal Grain Inquiry Commission , 1938 . The report deals ex-
tensively with the marketing policy developed by the Wheat
Pools and the rather unfortunate results of that experiment.
The Story of ftheat , a commercial publication by L. D.
Nesbitt, records the early history of the Canadian grain trade
excellently, but the later developments are presented in a
somewhat biased manner.
Several periodicals were relied upon to a considerable
extent. The Country Guide, published at Winnipeg, has devoted
a substantial amount of space to problems concerning the grain
trade. Most of the material presented is unbiased and proved
very useful in this study. The Wheat Pool Budget, The Searle
Grain Company Letter, and various statements prepared by the
Winnipeg Grain Exchange were used to some extent.
The Official Reporta of the debates in the House of Com-
mons
,
Ottawa, were relied upon heavily. Volume 92, numbers
28 and 29 contain much useful information concerning the five
year compulsory pool operated by the Canadian Wheat Board and
details of the Anglo-Canadian Wheat agreement. These reports
are available from the King's Printer, Ottawa.
A number of bulletins published by both the Wheat Pool
and the Winnipeg Grain Exchange were used.
Wheat Fields and Markets of the World by Rollin E. Smith
and Wheat by W. W. Swanson and P. C. Armstrong were depended
upon for most of the material concerned with the early history
and development of the grain trade. Smith's book gives an
excellent account of the world development up to 1906 while
Swanson and Armstrong dealt only with Canada but carry the
history up to 1928. World Wheat Planning and Economic Planning
in General by Paul de Havesy was found to be an excellent source
of statistical data for the period ending in 1939.
Method of Procedure
The marketing system which developed along with the
settlement and cultivation of Western Canada was ascertained
and this is reviewed briefly under the heading, Historical
Development. The year 1917 is considered the point of departure
of this study, since in that year the marketing system which
had been developed through the years was abandoned, and a new
system introduced In its stead. Thi3 new system which con-
sisted of a government agency assuming the responsibility for
disposing of the wheat crop, while considered a temporary
measure, had lasting effects upon the Canadian marketing sys-
te ...
The reasons for this change and the reasons for its last-
ing influence have been sought in the literature. Widely di-
vergent opinions have appeared in the literature and in an
effort to roooncile these differences a considerable amount of
correspondence has been carried on with several individuals
who are prominent in the Canadian grain trade or who are in-
terested in it from an academic point of view. The questions
raised in the literature and the answers provided by the gen-
tlemen with whom correspondence was carried on, provided the
basic material for this thesis.
Limitations
There are no doubt a number of considerations to be kept
in mind when deciding whether a particular marketing system is
a good one or not, but so far as the farmer is concerned the
main consideration assuming that a continuous market with
reasonable service does exist, probably is the amount of the
net return received for his product. Throughout the litera-
ture on Canadian grain marketing it is contended that some
system other than the one in use would have resulted in a
greater or a smaller net return* depending on the point of view
of the particular author. For the most part it seems impossible
to sayi with any degree of certainty, that some other system
would have provided a greater net return and so it is only pos-
sible, in appraising a marketing system, to speculate on this
very important point.
Another limitation to the usefulness of this study is the
fact that political considerations play an important role along
with the economic aspect of a marketing system. Both have
been given varying weights from time to time.
Geographical Setting
The area in which Canada's hard wheat is grown may be
likened to a triangle, with its base some 850 miles in length,
or roughly that distance between the 95th and the 120th merid-
ians extending along the 49th parallel. The hypotenuse of the
triangle extends northwest from the eastern extremity of the
base and meets the third side some 500 miles north of the
western extremity of the base in the area known as the Peace
River country. This triangle encloses about 168 thousand
square miles of occupied land which is about equal to the total
area of Kansas and Nebraska.
Between 90 and 95 percent of the Canadian wheat crop is
produced in this area and it is to this portion of the crop
only that the regulations of the Canadian V/heat Board apply.
It i3 therefore only with the marketing of wheat produced in
this area that this thesis is concerned.
Historical Background
When the territory In question was purchased by the
Canadian Government from The Hudson's Bay Company in 1870,
barely 9,000 acres were cultivated. However, with the com-
pletion of the trans-continental railway in 1886, and the
development of varieties of wheat suitable for the area, land
settlement accelerated. By 1906 more than 5 million acres
were cultivated.
An export market had been found for wheat by this time.
In 1878 a shipment was made via a United States railway to
the seaboard and thence to Scotland. In the years immediately
following the completion of the Canadian Pacific railway sev-
eral private companies established systems of elevators through-
out this area to facilitate marketing the crop. In 1887 the
Winnipeg Grain Exchange was opened for oash trading and facili-
ties for futures trading were added in 1904. Total storage
capacity west of the Great Lakes of 7£ million bushels in 1887
was increased to 21 million by 1900 and to 78 million by 1910.
Stanley N. Jones, Unpublished address delivered at the
Annual Meeting, Grain and Peed Dealers National Association, St.
Louis, Missouri, September 16, 1947.
The nature of the marketing enterprise which had developed
to meet the needs of expanded production by 1913 is aptly de-
scribed in this statement.
As the grain business expanded there was in-
creasing, competition. Very few points in the Viest
had less than three or four elevators competing for
business. A number of milling companies operated
large lines of elevators. There were commission
merchants and trackbuyers to compete for carload lots
of grain. There was keen competition on the part of
shippers, exporters and mill buyers for their offerings
on the Winnipeg market. Farmers' co-operative com-
panies had developed to large size and competed actively
in all branches of the grain trade. Under these con-
ditions, the wide price margins existing in earlier days
soon disappeared and it is safe to say that the spread
between the price received by the farmer in .Yestern
Canada and the price paid by the consumer in Canada
and elsewhere, when free open markets are allowed to
function has been reduced to a minimum, as close or
closer than in any other exporting country.
The system of marketing developed in Canada, which
I believe the best in the world, functioned very sat-
isfactorily under normal free open markets. There was
under such conditions, no difficulty in disposing of
the increasing volume of production. Supply and de-
mand conditions governed prices and generally these
were found satisfactory. The fine quality of our wheat
made for a steady demand and our better grades sold at
a premium over the best competing sorts.
I
A substantial international grain trade had developed by
the turn of the century. The rapid growth of an urban indus-
trial population in many parts of Europe, the abandonment of
many trade restrictions and the development of steam powered
steel ships were important factors in the building of this
Henry Gauer, "Wheat Marketing in Canada", Unpublished
address delivered to the Grain Exchange Lecture Club, Winnipeg,
Canada, December 2, 1948.
trade. By 1906 the United Kingdom Imported 90 percent of her
domestic wheat requirements and Germany and several other con-
tinental countries were significant importers. Of the 540
million bushels which entered world trade in the 1906-1907
g
crop year, 41 million bushels were exported by Canada.
The population of Canada was small and little of the ex-
panding production was required for domestic use. A ready mar-
ket was available in Europe, and the United States which had
occupied the position of major exporter for some time had
smaller quantities of wheat available for export due to in-
creased domestic requirements. The period between 1906 and
1913 was one of rapid development; in 1913 production approached
200 million bushels from approximately 11 million acres of land.
The average annual production for the period 1910-1914 was 196
million bushels of which 99 million or 50 percent was exported.
Average annual production had increased to 254 million bushels
in the period 1915-1919 of which 160 million bushels or 63
percent was exported.
Prom the outset, and as time went on and production in-
creased, it became increasingly true that Western Canada was
primarily a wheat exporter. As has been pointed out by a member
of the grain trade, "Western Canada must export or die in the
attempt."
Rollin E. Smith, Wheat Fields and Markets of the World ,
p. 109 and 129.
-
2 Ibid ., p. 16.
Leonard D. Nesbitt, The Story of Wheat, p. 52.
Jones, loc. clt.
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THE FIRST WHEAT BOARD
The first Intervention of the Dominion Government in the
grain trade was the result of difficulties which arose in the
acquiring of food supplies by the Allies during World Bar I.
In 1916 when a rrave food crisis appeared to be imminent the
Allies established a centralized agency known as the Grain Ex-
port Company for buying wheat in the North American markets.
By the early spring of 1917, this organization in the course of
bona-fide efforts to acquire adequate supplies of wheat, secured
a corner on the Winnipeg Hay futures market. When the "shorts"
discovered their position a panic occurred in the Winnipeg and
Chicago markets and the Government was forced to come to the
rescue. On June 11, 1917, the Government established the Board
of Grain Supervisors and vested In that body the power to fix
the price of Canadian wheat and to determine its movements from
the local elevator to the Allied purchasing agency. Futures
trading on the Winnipeg market was suspended on September 1,
1917, and remained suspended throughout the period of the Board's
activities. However, the other facilities of the grain trade
were used as previously. Prices set by tho Board were §2.40,
1 G. E. Britnell and V. C. Fowke, ed., "Development of
Wheat ilarketing Policy in Canada." Journal of Farm Economics,
XXXI, (November, 1949), p. G28.
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basis Ho. 1 Northern, Fort William, for the balanoe of the
1915 crop, $2.21 for the 1917 crop and f2.24£ for the 1918
crop.
The desired result of this was clearly that of holding
down the price of wheat in the face of a short supply in Europe
and crave need on the part of Allied countries. It has been
suggested that the price of wheat would likely have reached
three or four dollars per bushel if the Government had not
3instituted price control.
Concerning this first period of Government control the
folloY/inc statement is apt:
The inauguration of this Board was purely and
simply a war measure, and as such it was accepted by
all interests and met with their cooperation. One of
the first things the Board did was to fix the price
bolow what had been current on the open market.
Nevertheless, the price fixed, $2.21 per bushel for
No. 1 Northern Wheat basis in store Port iviiiiam and
Port Arthur was a high price in relation to other
commodities at the tine and one vrith which our farm-
ers appeared to be quite satisfied.*
Once the war was over and the crop of that year disposed
of by the Board of Grain Supervisors there seemed little reason
for this organization remaining in existence. Therefore on
July 21, 1919 the free market at Winnipeg was reopened. It
^ All wheat prices quoted henceforth are on the basis of
No. 1 Northern, in store, Fort V,illiani-Port Arthur.
^
Britnoll and Fowke, 0£. clt . , p. 629.
Stanley N. Jones, "Government Control and the Grain
Trade." Unpublished article, Winnipeg Grain Exchange, Winnipeg,
Canada, Kay, 1947.
4 Oauer, loc. clt.
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was apparent immediately that conditions were not normal.
The October contract which opened at $2.20 on July 21 advanced
to §2.45-£ by July 29; after six. days' trading the market was
again suspended. 1 On July 31 the first Canadian Wheat Board
was constituted to handle tho 1919-1920 crop.
The nature of this new organization, tho reasons which
prompted its formation and tho results of its operations are
highly significant factors in the Canadian grain trade.
The Wheat Board of 1919-1920 differed in important re-
spects from its predecessor, the Board of Grain Supervisors.
Whereas tho latter was a purchasing agency at a fixed price
and directed the movement of Canadian wheat, the Wheat Board
was a state operated compulsory pool. It took title to all
wheat marketed in Canada, paid the grower a fixed initial
payment and issued participation certificates for whatever
additional sums might be realized from the sale of the wheat.
The Wheat Board disposed of the crop as it saw fit and dis-
tributed the amount received over and above the initial pay-
ment on a pro-rata basis. The initial payment was set at $2.15
per bushel and additional payments brought the total proceeds
to §2.63 per bushel. The Board was discontinued in July, 1920.
It has been suggested that the formation of the Wheat
Board was a measure of aid to former allies and enemies in a
Jones, loc . clt .
2 Britnell and Fowke, og. clt ., p. 630.
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tlmo of critical wheat shortage, and while the markets in
these countries were still in a disorganized state. It has
also been suggested that the Canadian Government had committed
Itself to sales overseas at prices which would have resulted
in a substantial loss had it not taken over the marketing of
wheat
.
The significant point, however, is the opinion which was
developed at to the relative merits of the free market and a
Government Board.
Three years of complete control of Canadian
wheat marketing by the Dominion Government had done
nc thing to alter the official viewpoint (on the
part of the Government) that grain should normally
be marketed by means of the open market system. With
the growers, however, it was a different matter. The
possibility and comparative efficacy of a new system
of marketing had, as far as they were concerned, been
amply demonstrated. In the months which followed the
restoration of open market trading in 1920 the price
of wheat fell drastically. It was easy to argue that
the Board, had it been continued, might have prevented
or at least significantly tempered the decline. The
growers accordingly were determined not to remain
longer at the mercy of the open market systemT8
The alleged advantage of the pooling system is pointed
out again in this statements
But the grain producers of Western Canada have
long memories and do not intend to forget what
happened to them under the open market system in past
years. When the Wheat Board was thrown overboard in
1920 after World war I, the speculative marketing
system was given an opportunity to demonstrate its
value to the farmers of Western Canada. Wheat prices
J Oauer, loo , clt .
Brltnell and Powke, op . clt . , p. 630.
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hit & high of $2.85 a bushel early in September
1920 Just when wheat started to pour into the
market. Then a steady decline set in until by
December 1923, wheat had been carried to the low
average of 93£/. In that year the average farm
price in Alberta was 67/ a bushel compared with
an average price of $2.21 in 1919.
*
Neither of these two statements attempts to reconcile
the fact that while the averace price received by the Cana-
dian farmer was $2.63 per bushel in the crop year 1919-1920*
the average price at Minneapolis was "3.04 per bushel. Nor
does either statement attach any significance to the fact that
the 1919 crop was one of the smallest in years. Total exports
that year were only 92 million bushels while the average for
the five year period 1915-1919 was 160 million bushels. It is
true that wheat prices declined subsequently but this can be
associated with the post-war depression which struck at that
time, the revival of European agricultural production, discon-
tinuance of credits by Canada and the United States, relaxation
of government purchasing, the erection of tariff walls and
the dislocation of foreign exchange.
The revival of wheat production throughout the world is
considered by Oauer to be useful in explaining the price de-
cline. The reaction of this decline on farmers is also sug-
gested in this statementi
1 Alberta V«heat Pool Budget, February 2, 1951.
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Following the small world crop of wheat in
1919, 2,690 million, excluding Ru3sia and China,
there was a steady increase in the size of world
crops during the next four years—about 200 million
bushels more in 1920, about 400 million bushels more
in 1921, about 450 million bushels more in 1922, and
about 800 million bushels more in 1923, all exclusive
of Russia and China. A large part of these increases
were in Europe* Naturally under these conditions the
very high prices of the 1917-1920 period were bound
to decline to more normal levels. The average price
for One Northern wheat for the 1923-24 season was
$1.04-| per bushel basis store Fort V.'illiam and Port
Arthur, this comparing with pro-war prices of 89^
for the season of 1912-13 and 89?,/ per bushel for the
season of 1913-14. There was much dissatisfaction
among farmers because of this decline in price and,
thinking erroneously that the government appointed
Board of Supervisors and the Wheat Board were re-
sponsible for the high prices during the time they
were functioning, a strong movement arose for
restoration of such a Board.
1
It may be said then, in summarizing the marketing activi-
ties of this period, that during this critical time, when food
supplies were scarce there was a legitimate reason for gov-
ernment agencies taking an active part In marketing the wheat
crop. There is no doubt that one of the main objectives of
these agencies was to prevent price from rising excessively.
It was the exigencies of war and the shortage of grain which
caused the higher prices to exist, and the existence of higher
prices and upward pressure on prices was the cause and not the
result of government intervention. This fact seems to have been
completely overlooked, particularly in the statement quoted from
the Alberta Wheat Pool Budget. 2
£ Gauer, loc . clt .2 A weekly publication of the Alberta Wheat Pool, Calgary,
Canada.
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The association of hleh prices with government controlled
marketing and low prices with the free open market became very
strong in the minds of many people, especially those who did
not consider the basic facts of the situation. A student of
the Canadian grain trade, Professor Mackintosh, referred in
the following words to the farmers' attitude as:
The state of mind which connected the controlled
buying of the Wheat Board with high prices and (farm-
ers) looked to a similar organization to bring back
the halcyon days of two dollar wheat.
1
VOLUNTARY POOLING
Early Development
The demands on the part of farm organizations for the
restoration of a government sponsored Wheat Board became more
persistent as the price of wheat declined. The Dominion
Government passed an act which would have provided for a Board
to operate for a period not longer than two years. The Act,
however, required the concurrence of the Governments of the
three Prairie Provinces. Manitoba failed to concur, Alberta
and Saskatchewan agreed but were unable to find satisfactory
personnel to operate a Wheat Board. On June 29, 19P3, the
Grain Growers' Guide (later known as the Country Guide)
Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938,
p. 82.
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observed that the Wheat Board idea was dead.
In the- meantime the idea of a cooperative era1" pool had
been gaining favor. Such an organization came into being with
the commencement of operations by the Alberta Pool in the fall
of 1923. Similar pool3 were organized in Manitoba and Saskat-
chewan in 19S4 and the three formed a Central Selling Agency,
o
The Canadian Cooperative Wheat Producers.
The attitude which members held concerning this new or-
ganization is summarized from the evidence submitted to the
Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938.
The Pool movement was intended to secure all the
advantages thought to reside in centralized selling,
but without government control. As is stated In the
Pool brief (Ex 330, p. 7.) it was intended to bo "a
Wheat Board without government assistance." The
ideal of cooperation and producer control was empha-
sized as preferable to any contact with governments.
As late as the autumn of 1929 3uch sentiments were ,
expressed with great force by Pool leaders (Ex. 454).
The main advantage thought to reside in centralized selling
was that of price improvement. This improvement would result
by pursuing several main objectives:
(1) eliminate (or reduce) speculation, manipulation and
unnecessary transactions;
(2) stabilize the market;
(3) improve nethods and reduce costs of marketing;
1 Ibid ., p. 64.
^ Gauer, loc . clt .
" Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938,
p. 65.
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(4) market directly;
(5) market with regularity.
The Pool acted simply as a selling agenoy for its members
and in this respect differed from a conventional grain company.
Instead of making a coincident sale in the futures market when
wheat was acquired from a farmer as conventional companies did,
the Pool simply added the new purchase to the supply already
on hand. The additional risk which the Pool ran was shared
not only by those responsible for selling wheat but by each
member who delivered grain, since the producer received only
an initial payment when his grain was delivered to the eleva-
tor. If the grain was subsequently sold for more than the
initial payment the difference was made up to the member.
This system of partial payment made it possible for the Pools
to secure a line of credit from a bank for the purchase of
grain without hedging, since it was considered unlikely that
the ultimate selling price would be loss than the initial pay-
ment. A3 mentioned above it was tho producer who bore the risk.
By boycotting the futures market in this respect it was con-
sidered also that speculation and manipulation were reduced.
T.1 a futures market was used, however, as will be suggested be-
low, in an effort to stabilize the market. Direct marketing
was u.,od to a considerable extent and offices were established
in London and Paris to facilitate this. No attempt appears to
have been made to market with regularity. The selling policy
19
is described in this statements
The Pool was responsible for the disposal of
roughly one-half of the western wheat crop. It had
no automatic method of selling to be carried on
irrespectively of its own views as to price, as is
the case with elevator companies buying wheat from
farmers, but was necessarily required to regulate its
sales policy by the Judgment of its officials.
It is true that it might have adopted a policy
requiring no salesmanship whatever, that of selling
approximately equal quantities every month, every
week or every day, but as will be seen no such me-
chanical, automatic method was ever adopted. On the
contrary, the problem for the Cantral Selling Agency
was to decide when and how and in what quantities to
sell. Upon their decisions rested the return which
their members would receive for their grain and with
them the responsibility lay to insure, if possible,
that the risk of owning and carrying in one hand one-
half of the Canadian crop, a risk shared Jointly and
collectively by all Pool members instead of as former-
ly by outside speculators, did not bring disaster.
Wheat Pools in Difficulty
Something more than 50 percent of the Canadian wheat crop
was being marketed through these channels and the Pools were,
therefore, a significant factor in the grain trade. It has
been pointed out that these organizations were not required by
the banks, from which they received their line of credit, to
hedge their grain purchases as other companies were required
to do, since the Pools only gave the farmer a part of the value
of the crop at the time of delivery. This system was satis-
1 Ibid ., p. 66.
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factory while the market was reasonably stablo but it proved
to be quite the reverse at other times. During the first sev-
eral years of operation the Pools disposed of their wheat In
good time and at a price at least as high as that made in the
initial payments to the farmers. However, at August 31, 1929
the Pool had an unsold carry-over of 48 million bushels as
compared to no carry-over at the same date in 1928. The Pool
had virtually discontinued selling wheat In May, 1929, in the
face of falling prices which were considered to be the result
of a 'bear raid' on the market. The opinion which Pool offi-
cials held at that time is suggested by a statement of the
General Manager of the Central Selling Agency in a pamphlet
issued in May, 1929.
The increased consumption which has developed
this past year will in all probability provide a
market, and at a profitable figure, provided it is
marketed in a sane way. There is no doubt that a
reasonable price will be obtained for tho balance of
this year's and succeeding crops as we are adequately
financed and prepared to await the demand."
The Pool not only ceased selling in May but went further
and bought futures in an effort to counter balance the 'bear
raid' which was thought to be taking place. Something more
than six million bushels were purchased In May and were sold
out in June at a profit of more than half a million dollars.
* Ibid ., p. 73.
\ Ibid., ?• 76.
" This was actually the second venture of this kind. In
April, 1925, the Pool had purchased 3,435,000 bushels of futures
on which slightly less than one-half million dollars profit was
made. This action was explained as a counter measure to manipu-
lation and was intended to give strength to the market. (Report
of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938. p. 70.)
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The 1929 crop was harvested and 44 percent of It wa3 de-
livered to the Pool at an initial payment of $1.00 per bushel.
The holding policy which had been initiated earlier but had
been relaxed somewhat was again in effect. The general attitude
at that time is described by a Pool statement which appears in
The Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission of 1938.
On October 10, 1929, when the Winnipeg cash
price was $1.46J and the December future $1.47j-5/8:
The Pool in Control . There is a recognition of
the fact that Tt is the attitude pnd the stand taken
by the Canadian Wheat Pool which has held the price
of Canadian wheat to Its present level in the face of
the serious congestion in domestic storage warehouses.
So far as we can reeall, no more general recognition of
the power of the Wheat Pool to Influence prices or the
movement of Canadian grain renerai.1.,/ has been in evi-
dence since the formation of the Pool than is evident
at the present tirie.^
Again in November, 1929, in the face of rapidly falling
prices the Pool commenced buying futures and continued doing
so until April, 1930. The loss on this action was in excess
g
of two million dollars. This loss, however, was only a
small portion of the total difficulty which beset the Pool
during the 1929 crop year. The situation is described in the
following statement.
Wheat values were shaken throughout the world.
A persistent decline then commenced, and the Pool
was faced with the dilemma of having accepted millions
of bushels of wheat from members on the basis of $1.00
a bushel initial payment with the downward trend in
% price rapidly approachlnr that figure. The money for
* Ibid ., p. 90.
id., p. 70.
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the initial payment had been borrowed from the banks
on a 15 per cent margin, and those institutions
became much concerned.!
In January f 1930, the governments of the three prairie
provinces found it expedient to come to the aid of the Pools
by guaranteeing their deficit to the banks. This deficit
ultimately totalled 24 million dollars.
The guarantee of the Provincial Governments was concerned
only with the 1929 crop and the carry over of the 1928 crop.
Of course, the difficulty did not end here as is described in
the following statement:
The year 1930-31 produced new difficulties.
An initial payment of 70 cents for No. 1 Northern
was fixed on July 10 when the Winnipeg closing cash
price was 95 cents. The guarantee of the provincial
Governments did not extend to the 1930 crop. The
initial payment was reduced on August 14 to 60 cents,
again to 55 cents on September 11 and finally to 50
cents on November 8.
Prices continuing to fall, the Dominion Govern-
ment was called upon for assistance, and through an
arrangement entered into by the Central Selling Agency
and approved by all parties, Mr. John I. McFarland
became Manager of the Central Selling Agency in Novem-
ber 1930, taking charge of the carry-over and of the
1930 crop. Dominion Government guarantees were then
given to the banks.
On July 31, 1931, the Pools became separated from
the Central Selling Agency and since then have operated
as separate entities carrying on a country and terminal
elevator business. Thoy also operated voluntary sell-
oools, each in its own province, for those of their
members who wished to pool their grain. This voluntary
poollnr went on for the four years 1931-32-33-34, but
Nesbitt, 0£. cit., p. 36. The Pools i ire required to
hold stocks of grain having a market value 15 percent in excess
of their liability to the banks.
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was discontinued upon the establishment of the Cana-
dian Wheat Board in the summer of 1935. The voluntary
pooling operations were of small volume, slightly less
than 20 million bushels of wheat being marketed in
that manner during the four years.*
The errors made by Pool officials during 1929 and 1930
have not been reviewed for the purpose of discrediting either
the individuals concerned or the organization. The discussion
is significant in so far as the policy influenced the wheat
marketing system within Canada in the years to follow. The
Pool policy is also significant in so far as it affected the
attitude toward Canadian wheat in the export market and it is
also relevant to proposed marketing policies which will be
considered later.
STABILIZATION OPERATIONS
The marketing system which was used following the inter-
vention of the provincial governments in 1929 was character-
ized by further governmental activity. In November, 1930 the
Federal Government became involved, and what are referred to as
"stabilization operations" were carried out for the next five
years. The Central Selling Agency of the Pools became in ef-
fect an organ of the Federal Government, however, it appears
that the chairman, John I. McFarland was relatively free to
carry out policies which seemed best.
Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 35.
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The market was very unstable at that time, it was diffi-
cult for private grain merchants to hedge their purchases due
to the withdrawal of speculators from the market. The price
of wheat was still falling rapidly and large quantities of
wheat were being accumulated. The "stabilization operations"
were an effort to r estore some confidence in the market and to
stabilize the price of wheat through the purchase and sale of
futures. The operations are typified in the following state-
ment:
"PEGGING" OP WINNIPEG PRICES
Mr. McFarland says that in the fall of 1932 he
"attempted to support the market at 50 cents"....
This was unsuccessful as his credit was exhausted on
October 25 and the price fell. This was not strictly
a price peg.
On August 14, 1933, at Mr. McFarland's request,
an order of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange prohibited
trading in the October future below 70 1/8 cents a
bushel. The price then remained at or slightly above
this figure but from September 8 to 13 all trades were
made at the pegged level. Mr. McParland had to buy
heavily (14,653,000 bushels) in order that hedging
could be done. On September 15, the peg was removed
and the October future price fell during the next 30
days to 54 3/4 cents on October 16, despite net pur-
chases of 31,756,000 bushels by Mr. McParland.
On November 1, 1934, the Exchange at Mr. McFar-
land's request pegged the December future at 75 cents and
May at 80 cents. (Subsequently, the July future was also
pegged at 80 cents.) This peg wa3 maintained until the
July future expired, without the help of stabilization
purchases. 1
The net effect of these operations is difficult to appraise.
1 Ibid ., p. 98-99.
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A profit approaching 10 million dollars In cash was mado from
wheat accumulated during the "stabilization operations" but it
was the unanimous opinion of millers , merchants and traders
that harmful results accrued overseas. The following statement
is relevant.
They (millers , merchants and traders) all ex-
pressed the belief that its results were injurious to
the sale of Canadian wheat in the market. The market
dislikes selling monopolies or near-monopolies, the
retention of wheat from sale, or anything which looks
like an attempt to secure prices out of line with
those paid currently to other sellers. They blamed
the stabilisation measures for all these things. 2
The losses in volume which Canada suffered in the export
market started with the Pool holding policy in 1928 and carried
on through the stabilization operations. This was not so much
an absolute loss but a relative loss. The fact has been
raised above that as the population in the United States grew
that country relinquished much of its export market. In the
period 1922-27 the United States percentage of the world wheat
trade was 23.2, it was 17.7 percent in 1927-32, and 9.0 per-
cent in 1932-37. The new export outlets which thus became
available were secured In the main by Argentina and Australia
in spite of the fact that these two countries had poorer quality
wheat than Canada and were substantially further from the
Nesbitt, 0£. clt ., p. 38. This profit was not realized
until 1936 when the last of the accumulated wheat was sold by
the Canadian V.heat Board. The profits were added to the assets
of that organization.
* Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 99.
3 Ibid
., p. 140.
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European market. The annual production, export and year-end
stocks for Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States
for the years 1920-1948 are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.
It may be seen from these tables that production in each
country was increasing during the period considered. The in-
crease in both Argentina and Australia was being taken care of
by increased exports, in the United States by increased con-
sumption and some increase in carry-over and in Canada by dan-
gerous increases in carry-over.
There is no doubt that the Pool activities allowed
Argentina to capture an unnecessarily large portion of the
European market in 1928 and 1929 and again during the stabil-
isation operations the same condition seems to have been true.
It was rather this withholding of wheat from
the market, giving rise to a fear among buyers of
an attempt to extort unreasonable prices, that led
to the criticism overseas, and caused consumers to
turn elsewhere for their requirements. 2
Not only was considerable antagonism towards Canada en-
gendered but British millers discovered that a small percen-
tage of hard wheat could be mixed with the soft wheat available
from Argentina and Australia and a cheap and acceptable prod-
uct was thus obtained. This kind of loss is serious indeed.
Report of the Royal firain Inquiry Commission, 1930. p. 80.
2 Ibid ., p. 100.
3 Ibid ., p. 95.
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Table 1. Argentine
period
i wheat production and
1921-1948.
distribution for the
Year
:Acreage : Production
million: million
: Carry-over :D
: million :
omestlc use:
million !
Exports
million
: acres : bushels : bushels : bushels : bushol3
1910-14 15.1 154.7 - 71.3 83.4
1915-19 15.
1
177.0 - 79.7 97.3
1921 13.2 156.1 5.9 66.8 65.8
1922 14.1 191.0 29.4 64.3 145.4
1923 16.1 195.8 10.7 65.1 140.8
1924 17.0 247.8 0.6 68.3 169.9
1925 1G.0 191.1 10.2 70.8 116.9
1926 17.6 191.1 13.6 87.4 82.0
1927 19.0 230.1 35.3 83.3 163.9
1928 20.2 282.3 13.2 84.7 203.1
1929 22.4 349.1 12.7 86.2 249.9
1930 15.9 162.6 25.7 86.2 86.6
1931 19.5 232.3 15.5 93.4 138.1
1932 16.0 219.7 16.3 95.6 129.4
1933 17.8 240.9 11.0 96.0 149.4
1934 18.0 286.1 6.5 95.5 181.7
1935 17.2 240.7 15.4 92.1 146.3
1936 11.7 141.5 17.7 99.2 63.2
1937 17.6 249.9 - 3.2^- 99.3 147.6
1938 17.2 207.6 - 0.21 99.2 75.5
1939 20.1 379.1 32.7 101.0 179.4
1940 12.5 130.7 131.4 117.1 137.3
1941 16.6 299.5 7.7 100.6 90.0
1942 14.7 238.3 116.6 117.1 83.0
1943 12.0 235.2 154.8 120.6 76.1
1944 14.8 249.9 193.3 166.5 96.7
1945 10.8 150.1 180.0 154.6 95.5
1946 10.0 143.5 80.0 142.5 53.0
1947 13.9 206.3 28.0 124.6 84.7
1948 11.7 250.0 25.0 79.0
* The amount indicated was used from the new crop prior to
January 1.
Sourceil Nesbitt, Leonard D.. The Story of VJheat, p. 55.
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Table 2. Australian wheat production and distribution for the
period 1920-1948.
:Aoreage Production larry-over Domestic use: Exports
Year sml11Ion: million : million million Million
: acres : bushols : bushels bushels :bus^ols
Av. 1910--14 12.5 77.4 33.6 43.8
Av. 1915--19 9.6 113.6 47.3 66.3
1920 9.1 145.9 29.9 116.0
1921 9.7 129.1 5.0 44.6 84.5
1922 9.8 109.5 5.0 43.9 62.1
1923 9.5 125.0 8.5 42.4 81.2
1924 10.3 164.6 9.9 50.6 119.3
1925 10.2 114.5 4.6 37.8 74.4
1926 11.7 160.8 6.9 50.9 104.7
1927 12.3 118.2 12.1 40.9 80.5
1928 14.8 159.7 8.9 52.7 100.3
1929 15.0 126.9 15.6 52.7 76.0
1930 18.2 213.6 13.8 52.8 158.0
1931 14.7 190.6 16.
S
46.1 150.3
1932 15.8 213.9 10.8 56.7 149.5
1933 14.9 177.3 18.5 61.2 94.5
1934 12.5 133.4 40.1 52.3 104.5
1935 12.0 144.2 16.7 35.0 97.5
1936 12.3 151.4 8.4 51.5 99.4
1937 13.7 187.3 8.9 52.1 130.2
1938 14.3 155.4 13.9 57.4 90.9
1939 13.3 210.5 21.0 59.7 94.3
1940 12.6 82.2 77.5 59.6 58.1
1941 12.0 166.7 42.0 59.6 44.6
1942 9.3 155.7 104.5 68.9 37.3
1943 7.9 109.7 154.0 94.6 91.2
1944 8.5 52.9 77.9 100.3 19.0
1945 11.4 142.4 11.5 76.6 57.1
1946 13.2 117.3 20.2 67.9 56.1
1947 13.9 220.0 13.5 80.0 130.0
1948 13.0 200.0 - - ~
Source
:
Nosbitt, Leonard D., The Story of V.heat, p. 54.
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Table 3. Canadian wheat production and distribution for the
period 1920-1948.
: Acreage: Production : Carry-ovon Domestic use: Kxports
Year :milllon: million i million i million : million
: acres : bushels : bushels : bushels : bushels
Av. 1910-•14 10.5 196.1 97.3 98.8
Av. 1915-19 16.4 254.5 94.3 160.2
1920 18.2 263.2 96.4 166.8
1921 23.3 300.9 14.1 107.5 185.4
1922 22.4 399.8 22.1 130.7 279.0
1923 21.9 474.2 12.2 92.2 346.1
1924 22.1 262.1 48.1 87.4 192.1
1925 20.8 395.5 30.7 61.9 324.2
1926 22.9 407.1 40.1 99.1 292.5
1927 22.5 479.7 55.6 111.6 352.5
1928 24.1 566.7 91.2 124.5 406.2
1929 25.3 304.5 127.2 120.2 184.9
1930 24.9 420.7 126.6 150.3 258.4
1931 26.4 321.3 138.6 117.2 206.8
1932 27.2 443.1 135.9 97.2 264.1
1933 26.0 281.9 217.7 102.3 194.4
1934 24.0 275.8 202.9 99.9 164.9
1935 24.1 281.9 213.9 114.3 254.1
1936 25.6 219.2 127.4 114.8 194.8
1937 25.6 180.2 37.0 105.9 86.8
1938 25.9 360.0 24.5 116.5 1 .1
1939 26.8 520.6 102.9 115.5 207.5
1940 28.7 540.2 300.5 136.5 224.1
1941 21.9 314.8 480.1 149.2 221.9
1942 21.6 556.7 423.8 183.2 202.7
1943 16.8 284.5 594.6" 174.6 348.0
1944 23.3 416.6 356.5 181.8 333.2
1945 23.4 318.5 258.1 167.1 335.9
1946 24.1 413.7 73.6 160.1 239.8
1947 24.3 336.8 87.4 148.7 199.5
1948 24.1 393.3 76.0 - -
Source: Nesbitt, Leonard D., The Story of V/heat, p. 52.
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Table 4. United States wheat production and distribution for
the period 1920-1948.
[Acreage: Production :Carry-ovor
:
Dovostic usesEicports
Year :millions million : million : million smillion
! acres : bushels : bushol3 : bushels :;;...; :.!_.;
Av. 1910-14 50.3 724.4 117.0 578.2 154.8
Av. 1915.-19 59.1 823.8 99.4 599.9 203.3
1920 62.4 843.3 170.0 576.7 312.6
1921 64.6 819.0 124.0 581.4 265.6
1922 61.4 846.6 96.0 605.5 205.1
1923 56.9 759.5 132.0 623.1 131.4
1924 52.5 841.6 137.0 615.9 254.7
1925 52.4 868.7 108.0 586.8 92.9
1926 56.6 832.2 97.0 614.3 205.9
1927 59.6 875.1 109.0 680.1 191.0
192S 59.2 914.4 113.0 659.4 141.0
1929 63.4 824.2 227.0 619.8 140.3
1930 62.6 886.5 291.1 753.0 112.1
1931 57.7 941.5 312.5 755.8 122.9
1932 57.9 756.3 375.3 721.9 31.9
1933 49.4 552.2 377.8 631.7 25.4
1934 43.3 526.1 272.9 65R.1 - 5.0l
1935 51.3 628.2 145.9 664.1 -30.4*
-25.
2
11936 49.1 629.9 140.4 692.7
1937 64.2 873.9 83.2 704.6 99.4
1938 69.2 919.9 153.1 716.6 106.4
1939 52.7 741.2 250.0 666.9 44.6
1940 53.3 814.6 279.7 679.5 30.1
1941 55.9 942.0 384.7 671.9 24.0
1942 49.8 969.4 630.8 954.1 27.2
-73. 11943 51.4 843.8 618.9 1,219.3
1944 59.7 1,060.1 316.6 991.6 105.9
1945 65.1 1,108.2 279.2 899.3 388.0
1946 67.1 1,153.0 100.1 775.2 394.1
1947 74.4 1,367.2 83.8 775.7 479.6
1948 71.9 1,288.4 195.7 - "
•*• The amounts indicated were net imports.
Source: Nesbitt, Leonard D.
,
The Story of Wheat, p. 23.
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In Kay, 1935) the Central Soiling Agency hold some 230
million bushels of wheat. Mr. McParland's stabilization oper-
ations were doing little to improve the price and the embar-
rassing surplus of wheat continued to grow. It was obvious
that some new action had to be taken and for the second time
in Canadian history a national TCheat Board was established.
THE SECOND NATIONAL WHEAT BOARD
The Canadian Wheat Board Act of 1935 introduced a new
stability to the market, by establishing a minimum floor
price, and at the same tine corrected several malpractices
of the "stabilization operations." Following the election
of 1935 a statement issued by the newly appointed Minister
of Trade and Commerce indicated the change in policy.
The concentration of surplus stocks of wheat
in Canada during the past few years has created an
abnormal situation in the world's wheat trade.
Last June this situation was recognized by
Parliament as not being in the interests of Canada or
her wheat producers, and the Dominion Government de-
sires to have our surplus restored to a normal basis.
To accomplish this the Wheat Board will seek the
good will and co-operation of the grain and milling
trades in all importing countries.
It is not necessary to have and there will not
be any 'fire sale' of Canadian wheat, but it will be
for sale at competitive values and will not be hold
at exorbitant premiums over other wheats. *
The Canadian '.Vheat Board, 1935-46, p. 10.
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The Bill originally written would have granted monopoly-
power to the Board to handle all wheat produced in »Vestern
Canada, and there seems little doubt that the farmers' organ-
izations, mainly the Wheat P00I3, would have preferred this
type of legislation. However, the traditional view that wheat
should be marketed by private agencies prevailed and a bill
so written became law. The legislation provided for the
appointment of a three member Board and a seven member Advis-
ory Committee. Mr. John I. Mcfarland, the first Chief Com-
missioner took office in August, 1935. The newly appointed
Board provided a voluntary marketing organisation prepared to
buy wheat from producers at a fixed price established by the
Board, (subject to the approval of the Governor in Council),
and subject to adjustment from year to year. The producer also
received a participation certificate which entitled him to a
share of any profits realized by the Board. At times when the
open market price was higher than the fixed price it was un-
likely that any wheat would be marketed through the Board. At
times when the fixed price was above the open market price
most of the wheat was delivered to the Board. The important
point is that the farmer had an alternative market through
which he might dispose of his wheat and he was free to exer-
cise his own Judgment as to which he should use.
Four paragraphs in the Act refer to the marketing policy
to be employed by the Board.
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Sect. 8, paragraph (b) t stated that it was the
duty of the Board "to sell and dispose of from time to
time all wheat which the Board may acquire, for such
price as it may consider reasonable, with the object
of promoting the sale and use of Canadian wheat in
world markets".
Sect. 8, paragraph (c), stated that it was the
duty of the Board "to sell and disposs of stocks of
wheat and contracts for the delivery of wheat ac-
quired from Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers,
Limited, and the wheat represented by such contracts
as may be reasonably possible, having regard to
economic and other conditions".
Sect. 8, paragraph (i), stated that it was the
duty of the Board "in selling and disposing of wheat as
by this Act provided, to utilize and employ without
discrimination such marketing agencies, Including com-
mission merchants, brokers, elevator men, exporters
and other persons engaged in or operating facilities
for the selling and handling of wheat, as the Board
in its discretion may determine".
Sect. 8, paragraph (j), stated that it was the
duty of the Board "to offer continuously wheat for
sale in the markets of the world through the es-
tablished channels: Provided that the Board may, if
in its opinion any existing agencies are not oper-
ating satisfactorily, take such steps as it deems
expedient to establish, utilize and employ its own
or other marketing agencies or channels".*
Section 7 (b) of the Act provided that "no wheat shall
be purchased by the Board except from the producer thereof".
Sections 7 (b) and 8 (j) in particular, mark a departure
from the previous system. There was no longer an attempt to
influence price either by the system of buying futures in the
open market or by accumulating large quantities of wheat and
The Canadian Wheat Board 1935-46, p. 6. For Sect. 8,
paragraph (i) see ReDort of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission,
1938, p. 101.
2 Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938,
loc. cit.
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holding It off the market. The attempts to manipulate supply
and demand during the previous period probably Improved the
Canadian price somewhat but this improvement was of question-
able net benefit when it is recalled that sales declined
seriously during the period.
The purpose of the legislation is aptly described as
follows:
There is no doubt that the intent of the Canadian
Wheat Board Acti 1935, was to protect the Canadian
producer against untimely developments in the inter-
national wheat situation. In actual fact, the Cana-
dian Wheat Board, through its power to fix a minimum
price, through its power to receive Dominion financ-
ing, and through its power to transfer deficits to the
Dominion Government, really acted as a buffer between
chaotic conditions in the International wheat market
and the farmers on the land in Western Canada.
Under thi3 legislation the burden of inter-
national conditions as affecting wheat, did not fall
entirely upon the producer of wheat but was shared
between the producer and the country at large. 1
Professor Bladen has suggested, however, that the farmers
would have preferred a similar organization to the monopoly
Board of 1919.2
In September, 1935 the price which would prevail through
that year was fixed at 87j cents per bushel. When freight and
other charges v.ere deducted from this figure, approximately 70
cents per bushel was left for the producer. The market price
was slightly above 87^ cents per bushel when the Board price
was fixed but declined subsequently and remained below during
Tj The Canadian Wheat Board 1935-46, p. 7-8.
* Bladen, L. V., An Introduction to Political Economy .
p. 143.
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about eight months of the crop year.
With this price relationship in effect it is natural
that 141 million bushels out of a total country marketing
of 216 million bushels were delivered to the Board.
There was evidence that the spirit of the new legislation
particularly Section 8 (j), was not being carried out as net
sales during the four month period from August to November
amounted to so;ae 12j million bushels. In December the per-
sonnel of the Board was changed and the Advisory Committee
was dispensed with, it being considered that this body was
unnecessary. With Mr. J. R. Murray as Chief Commissioner, the
more vigorous sales policy endorsed by the government was
followed. The crop failures in the United States and the
Argentine in 1935 and the drought conditions in North America
during 1936 aided Canada, the now willing seller, to dispose
of a substantial quantity of wheat. By July, 1936 all but two
million bushels purchased by the Board in 1935 had been sold
and the stabilization holdings of something more than 200
million bushels had been reduced to 82.7 million. A net loss
of 11.9 million dollars was suffered on the sale of the 1935
crop, and of course, the participation certificates were
valueless.
* The Canadian V.heat Board 1935-46, p. 10.
| Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Conmlssion, 1958, p. 103.A The Canadian Wheat Board 1935-46, p. 11.
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This marketing sy3tera will be considered in more detail
later in the discussion but some of the difficulties facing the
Board may be mentioned here. The Board was required to set a
price at the beginning of the season which would remain in
effect for the entire crop year. Regardless of what that price
was the Board was required to accept all deliveries from pro-
ducers} who saw fit to deliver to the Board, and offer it imme-
diately for sale at the open market price. Thus the possibil-
ity of a two price system was avoided. Although a producer
might deliver his wheat to the Board regardless of what the
open market price was, it seems reasonable to suspect that such
deliveries would only be made when the open market price was
less than the fixed price. It may be seen that under this
arrangement it was difficult for the Board to avoid losing
money. During the crop year in question the open market price
ranged between 73 5/8 cents and $1.03 3/8 with, as has been
mentioned above, the price below 87J cents for approximately
eight months. Therefore, it was possible for the Board to
lose up to 13 7/8 cents per bushel on wheat purchases. How-
ever the average loss on the entire amount handled was approx-
imately 8 cents per bushel. It would of course have been
possible for the Board to have broken even or even made some-
thing to return to producers had the wheat delivered remained
in its possession until the price rose above 87& cents*
A price of 87£ cents per bushel was fixed again in August,
1936 to apply to deliveries from that orop. However, an
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additional proviso was made whereby ths Board would only ac-
cept deliveries if the open market price fell below 90 cents
per bushel. Since the price remained above 90 cents through-
out the year the Board did not handle any of the 1936 crop.
The remainder of the "stabilization" stocks were disposed of
that year at a profit approaching ten million dollars.
The smallest wheat crop since 1914 was harvested in Canada
in 1937. The price remained above 90 cents and for a second
o
year the fixed price was ineffective.
There was a sharp change in the wheat situation during
1938. While Canada had disposed of practically all of its
1937 crop, this was not so elsewhere, particularly in the United
States. As the 1938 season advanced there was every indication
that the wheat crop would be considerably larger than that of
the five previous years. This condition along with continued
low demand caused Mr. Justice Turgeon to report to the Gov-
ernment in the following manner:
For all these reasons (and not withstanding the
adverse considerations to which I have referred in
relation to government Boards) I do not feel that I
can suggest the immediate dissolution of the Canadian
Wheat Board. There is a strong possibility that con-
ditions may develop which will require a measure of
assistance in the marketing of the coming crop, and I
do not know, of course, how long these conditions may
continue after the final chapter of this report is
written. In the meantime 1 can think of nothing
better to suggest than that the Board be maintained to
_ Loc . clt .
Bid., p. 12.
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meet any situation which may arise.
The Government subsequently announced that the Board
would remain in operation in 1238 and that a minimum price of
80 cents per bushel would be made as an initial payment. The
early appraisal of the difficulties which would arise from
wheat surplus that year v.ere amply borne out. So far aa Can-
ada was concerned it suffices to say that the final account of
the 1938 crop was not closed out until 1942 and the Wheat Boerd
recorded a deficit of $61.5 million.
This heavy loss prompted two important amendments to the
Wheat Board Act:
(1) The fixed initial price for the 1939 crop was estab-
lished at 70 cents a bushel by Parliament, thus shifting the
responsibility of price fixing from the Board to Parliament.
(2) Deliveries from any one producer were limited to 5,000
bushels in any one crop year subsequent to the passage of the
amendment.3
A substantial carry-over of wheat from the 1938-1939 crop
year indicated that Government aid would be necessary again in
1939-1940. The outbreak of war, however, brought an improved
export demand and the price advanced above the minimum fixed,
and remained above throughout most of the year. The Board was
Report of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938,
p. 194.
s Report of the Canadian V.heat Board, Crop Year 1941-1942,
p. 23.
3 The Canadian Wheat Board 1935-46, p. 14.
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able to dlspo3s of 247 million bushels during the crop year
but some 300 million bushels remained as the total carry-over
on July 31, 1940. 1
Farmers anticipating conditions similar to those exper-
ienced during World War I increased the wheat acreage by two
million acres in 1940. Favorable growing conditions together
with the record seeded acreage resulted in a 540 million
bushel crop. This amount of wheat added to the carry-over from
the previous year caused a severe storage problem. A system
of payment for on-the-farm storage was introduced, and pre-
sumably to offset this cost, a processing tax of 15 cents per
bushel was levied on all wheat utilized for human consumption.
This tax produced a net revenue of $5.8 million dollars. 2
In an effort to prevent further pressure beinf* added to
an already strained system a policy of acreage control was
introduced in 1941 to apply to the 1941-1942 crop year. It
was hoped that the crop in that year could be restricted to
230 million bushels, the amount which it was estimated would
meet domestic and export demand for the year. The still re-
maining surplus from previous years was treated as a war-time
reserve.
The crop in that year turned out almost exactly as was
hoped, 228 million bushels were harvested. Two bulk sales
were made to the United Kingdom during the year which together
„ The Canadian Wheat Board 1935-46, p. 16.
* Ibid ., p. 17.
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with other consumption reduced the carry-over at the end of
the year to 60 million bushels*
The Government policy remained essentially the same in
the 1942-1943 crop year. Acreage reduction was still in ef-
fect but the initial payment was advanced from 70 cents to
90 cents per bushel. Early in 1943 improved demand became a
noticeable factor and by March the open market price had moved
above the Board's initial price and 38 percent of the total
authorized deliveries under the Government's crop reduction
scheme were disposed of through the open market and the re-
o
maining 62 percent through the Board.
This system, which seemed to have been operating with
reasonable success was suddenly abandoned on September 27,
1943, and for the second time a Government monopoly appeared
in the Canadian grain trade.
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY IN THE GRAIN TRADE
The War Years
The complete change in policy which was thus effected is
summarized by the Canadian ;>'heat Board under the following
points:
3ritnell and Powke, 0£. cit . , p. 638.
8 Loc. cit.
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(1) The discontinuance of wheat trading on
the Winnipeg Grain Exchange;
(2) The raising of the fixed initial price to
producers from 90 cents per bushel to ftl.25 per
bushel;
(3) The purchase by the Board, on behalf of the
Dominion Government, of all stocks of unsold wheat
in commercial positions in Canada on September 27,
1943;
(4) Tho closing out of the 1940-1941, 1941-1942
and 1942-1943 Wheat Board accounts on the basis of
closing market prices on September 27, 1943;
(5) The use of Government-owned wheat (Items 3
and 4 above) to meet requirements under Mutual Aid and
to provide wheat for subsidized domostic purchasers.!
What was tho motive behind this change? A press announce-
ment of jeptember 28, 1943, by the Minister of Trade and Com-
merce stated that the change in wheat policy was necessary be-
cause of the unusual circumstances surrounding the marketing
of Canadian wheat; and added that transportation difficulties
had Interfered with the normal functioning of the Winnipeg
market so that farmers had not been able to benefit fully
o
from rising prices.
A substantial quantity of the wheat in Canada was in
farm arid country elevator storage. The supply of railway cart
suitable for moving grain was short due to the pressure of
other transportation needs of the war period. Western farmers
were still on a delivery quota basis. It is likely that these
* Report of the Canadian Wheat Board, 1943-44, p. 3.2 Jones, 0£. clt . , p. 6.
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factors would have caused an Increase in the price of wheat had
the Government not been in control* when it was learned short-
ly afterwards, that large bulk sales had been made to the
United Kingdom and the United Stutes. It is reasonable to
assume that the Government wished to prevent a substantial
price rise since it would have greatly increased the cost of
wheat purchases to be used for Mutual Aid (an assistance program
applicable tc Allied nations) and thus added an additional
strain on the Treasury. It was, no doubt, also the Government's
desire to prevent the cost of living from rising, in this re-
speot, within Canada. Another, and no doubt very important
reason, for the establishment of a Government monopoly is sug-
gested.
The change in the wheat marketing policy which was
made in 1943 placed the Dominion Government In a stra-
tegic position for the formulation of policy for the
post-war period. The Government made it clear that the
first consideration would be to supply Canadian wheat
in maximum quantities to meet the desperate food re-
quirements of European countries. For the longer run
the Government has consistently pursued the goal of
greater market stability for the wheat economy.
1
The idea of a post-war policy directed towards stability
was, no doubt, very much in the mind of the Minister of Agri-
culture, Mr. Gardiner, who was one of the major architects of
the new wheat policy. His concern for the post-war period is
suggested in this statement "When the five year pool was
announced on September 19, 1945, the war had Just ended—and
Britnell and Fowke, 0£. cit. , p. 639.
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we were facing ths uncertainties of the future It was thought
by moat persons that prices would go down."*
There were no substantial changes in the policy during
the next two years. The stocks of wheat acquired in 1943, and
that added subsequently, were disposed of through domestic use
and the Mutual Aid program, as needs arose. On July 31, 1945,
258 million bushels of wheat were in the possession of the
Wheat Board as carry-over into the next crop year.
The Five Year Pool
With the completion of World War II in the late summer
of 1945 it might have been expected that some measure of de-
control would be initiated. On the contrary, the compulsory
Wheat Board was established in the Canadian economy for a five
year period. Under this arrangement the Board would continue
as the sole purchaser of wheat and the crop years 1945-1946
to 1949-1950 would constitute a single pool. As previously,
the producer would receive an initial payment on delivery with
participation certificates to represent his further equity.
The Government's Intention to stabilize th? wheat market
and also its plan in regard to selling policy are suggested in
this statement.
Hansard, House of Commons Debate, p. 1060, Karoh 8,
1951.
44
On September 19, 1945, the Dominion Government
announced that for the time being Canadian wheat was
to be offered for export at a price not exceeding
|1.55 per bushel for No. 1 Northern wheat basis in
store Fort Y;'illlam/port Arthur or Vancouver. At the
same time the Dominion Government announced that "as
a further means of stabilizing wheat prices during
the post-war period, it is the intention that steps
shall be taken to ensure that producers will not at
any time up to July 31, 1950, receive less than ";1.00
per bushel for No. 1 Manitoba Northern wheat, basis
in store Fort Yililliam/Port Arthur or Vancouver, on
the authorized deliveries for each crop year".*
With the exception of the private grain trade it can be
said that the five year pool was Greeted enthusiastically by
Canada. The fl.00 floor price was encouraging to all who
could remember the decline in price following World War I.
The reasonable selling price led most people to believe that
an expanding market, that could be relied upon in the years
ahead, would be established for Canadian wheat. A statement
which is typical of many whloh appeared in the press at that
time is included. Under the heading, "The New Wheat Policy"
the Winnipeg Free Press of September 21, 1945, had this to
say:
The statement on wheat prices made on Wednesday
by Trade Minister MacKinnon is a major decision of
post-war policy. In the first place, the decision
not to exact the last available cent which the prospect
of hunger would force our customers to pay, is a long-
sighted effort to ensure indispensable markets in the
years ahead. At the same time, the fixing of a floor
to producers for five years will remove the threat of
ruinous prices and make a contribution of great im-
portance to the stability of farm income In Western
Canada for a substantial period.
The Canadian V.heat Board 1935-46, p. 48.
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The Government has instructed the Wheat Board
to continue to offer wheat for export at $1.55 per
bushel basis No. 1 Northern, Fort William—the price
which prevailed at the end of hostilities. Owing to
the dire need of European countries and small crops in
some areas a higher price could be obtained for a short
while on the basis of credit. This temptation was
resisted because, as Mr. MacKinnon made clear:
•Any further Increase in wheat prices now would
aggravate the problems of economic and political
readjustment of the liberated areas to Canada's detri-
ment in future trade with those areas . Higher wheat
prices would encourage the importing countries in a
hurried return to wheat production and pre-war wheat
policies very directly to the detriment of the wheat ex-
porting countries, particularly Canada. Moreover,
production in a number of exporting countries would be
unduly encouraged 1 .
The average return from exports and the domestic
market will probably bring something over $1.40 basis
Fort William, for wheat now being disposed of. It will
b« generally agreed that, under the present circumstances,
such a price is a profitable one for farmers. It is
worthy of note that the Government's instructions to the
Wheat Board to offer wheat for export at $1.55 does not
specify a period of time. That is to be the policy in the
light of present and anticipated conditions.
The Government's commitment respecting the 'floor'
price is definite as to duration—namely, '...in the
five-year period ending July 31, 1950, producers will
receive not less than $1 per bushel, basis No. 1 North-
ern in store Fort William, Port Arthur or Vancouver, on
authorized deliveries for each crop year'. The 'floor' Is
to be not less than $1.00; it could be more according to
circumstances and Government decision from year to year.
For the present crop year, 1945-46, the effective floor
is the initial price of $1.25.
The guaranteed minimum of $1.00 will, in the light
of past experience and the ruinous prices that have
sometimes prevailed, be a factor of great Importance in
the life of western agriculture. For almost half the
period since 1920 the average annual price was below
$1.00. The average open market price for as late as 1942
was less than $1.00. The Wheat Board minimum price at
the beginning of the war was 70/, and the initial price
in the present Wheat Board Act is only 90/. The assur-
ance which has been given to wheat growers over the next
five years is far more valuable than the dubious bene-
fits of a short-lived boom.
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The new wheat price policy Is basically con-
sistent with the Government ' s general efforts to
prevent a disruptive post-war inflation and with
its active endeavors to obtain and hold prosperous
export markets for the yoars ahead. No area has a
greater stake In the full attainment of these ob-
jectives than Western Canada •*
Mr. Justice Turgeon had Issued a warning to the Government
in 1938 concerning the weakness of such a pool but thl3 point
will be considered bolow.
So far as was known at the outset it was the Government's
Intention to have the Wheat Board dispose of all the Canadian
wheat crop in both domestic and foreign markets on a first
here, first served basis. It appeared later, however, that a
somewhat different selling policy was to be used. The Oovern-
ment, faced with the responsibility of disposing of the entire
wheat crop, saw fit to seek long term contracts with wheat
importing countries. Long term contracts if made at a suf-
ficiently high price would remove the possibility of any
embarrassment to the Government in the event that world wheat
prices declined below the $1.00 minimum price, which had been
promised the farmers for the duration of the compulsory pool.
Canadian-United Kinrdom Agreement
One such long term contract was signed with the United
Kingdom and the complete text of that agreement is given herein:
Alberta Wheat Pool Budget, January 20, 19SO.
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AGREEMEIIT ED DOM
FOR THE PURCHASE OF CANADIAN WHEAT
Signed at Ottawa, July 24, 1946
The Government of Canada and the Government of the United
Kingdom, recognising that their mutual Interest in the main-
tenance of reasonable prices and adequate supplies of wheat for
consumers and of steady and remunerative prices for producers
can best be met by International co-operation in the expansion
of world trade and employmnt, have entered into the following'
arrangements designed to ensure a measure of security in the
supply and of stability in the price of wheat supplied by
Canada to the United Kingdom: --
(1). (a), The United Kingdom Government undertakes to pur-
chase and the Canadian Government undertakes to sell tho fol-
lowing quantities of Canadian wheat, which quantities Include
wheat to be processed into flour for sale to the United Kingdom
Government
:
(i) within the crop year 1946-47,
160,000,000 bushels;
(ii) within the crop yetr 1947-48,
160,000,000 bushels;
(iii) within the crop year 1948-49,
140,000,000 bushels;
(iv) within the crop year L949-50,
1^0,000,000 bushels.
A bushel shall be of the weight of 60 pounds avoirdupois.
(b) In the event of the United Kingdom requiring from
Canada any additional quantities of wheat that the" Canadian
Government is prepared to make available, such additional quan-
tities which the Canadian Government offers and the United
Kingdom Government accepts shall in all respects be subject to
the provisions of this Agreement.
(c) Of the total quantity of wheat specified above for
each crop year, the United Kingdom Government agrees to take
the following quantity in long tons In the form of flour:
1946-47 500,000 tons as a minimum, with an additional
quantity not exceeding 140,000 tons to be de-
termined by negotiations in the light of the
out-turn of tho crop.
1947-48 400,000 tons as a minimum, with an additional
quantity not exceeding 140,000 tons to be de-
termined by negotiations in the light of the
out-turn of the crop.
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1948-49 300,000 tons as a minimum, the actual tonnage
to be negotiated by the 1st July, 1947.
1949-50 300,000 tons as a minimum, the actual tonnage
to be negotiated by the 1st July, 1948.
(d) The rate and place of deliveries of wheat and
flour shall be determined from time to time by mutual agree-
ment*
(2). (a) The prices per bushel to be paid by the United
Kingdom Government to the Canadian Government, on the basis
Number One Manitoba Northern, in store Port T.'illiam/Port Arthur,
Vancouver or Churchill, shall be as follows :«
(i) In respect of wheat bought and sold in the
crop year 1946-47, $1.55.
(ii) In respect of wheat bought and sold in the
crop year 1947-48, $1.55.
(iii) In respect of wheat bought and sold in the
crop year 1948-49, not less than $1.25.1
(lv) In respect of wheat bought and sold in the
crop year 1949-50, not less than fl.OO.1
(b) The actual prices to be paid for wheat to be
bought and sold within the crop year 1948-49 shall be negotiated
and settled between the United Kingdom Government and the Cana-
dian Government not later than the 31st December, 1947, and
prices for wheat to be bought and sold within the crop year
1949-50 shall be negotiated and settled not later than the 31st
December, 1948. In determining the prices for these two crop
years, 1948-49 and 1949-50, the United Kingdom Government will
have regard to any difference between the prices paid under
this Agreement in the 1946-47 and 1947-48 crop years and the
world prices for wheat in the 1946-47 and 1947-48 crop years.
(c) The prices to be paid for grades other than
Number One Manitoba Northern to be delivered under this Agree-
ment shall be determined yearly In consultation between the
United Kingdom Government and the Canadian Government.
(d) In addition to the prices detailed in Section (a)
of this Article, the United Kingdom Government undertakes to pay
such carrying and forwarding charges as may be mutually arranged.
1 As a result of negotiations between the Government of
Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom, the following
prices were established:
—
Crop Years 1948-49 $2.00 per Bushel Basis No. 1 Northern
1949-50 in store Fort William, Port Arthur
and Vancouver.
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(e) Payment shall be made In full in Canadian funds
at par Winnipeg by the United Kingdom Payments Office against
presentation of completed statements of claim or otherwise
as may be mutually agreed.
(S) It is agreed that the United Kingdom Government may
sell or dispose of the wheat and flour purchased under this
Agreement in whatsoever manner the United Kingdom Government
may deem expedient both in regard to destination and price.
(4) (a) The Canadian Government will use it3 best en-
deavours to arrange that the quantities of wheat 3et out in
Article I (a) shall at all times be available and at the dis-
posal of the United Kingdom Government within the stipulated
dates and in accordance with the rates and places of delivery
determined under Section (d) of Article I of this Agreement.
(b) The United Kingdom Government will use its best
endeavours to arrange for the provision of the required ocean
tonnage within the stipulated dates and in accordance with the
rates and places of delivery determined under Section (d) of
Article I of this Agreement.
(5) It is agreed that the detailed terms and conditions
relating to such matters as carrying and forwarding charges,
grades, routelng of shipments and all other matters incidental
to the fulfillment of this Agreement 3hall be discussed and
settled from time to time and incorporated in documents to form
annexures to this Agreement.
(6) It is mutually understood that matters arising from,
or incidental to, the operation of this Agreement may at the
Instance of either party become subjects of discussion between
the parties to this agreement.
(7) Having in mind the general purposes which this Agree-
ment is designed to serve, the two Governments have agreed
that its terms and conditions shall be subject to any modifi-
cation or amendment which may be necessary to bring it into
conformity with any International agreements or arrangements
hereafter entered into to which both Governments are parties.
Done in duplicate, in Ottawa, on the twenty-fourth day of
July, 1946. 1
For the Government of Canada:
Jas. A. MacKinnon
For the Government of the United Kingdom:
P. A. Clutterbuek
1 Treaty Series, 1946. No. 30.
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Other European countries were approached with the idea of
arriving at similar contracts. The minister of Agriculture,
Mr. Gardiner, in an address given in Montreal in the autumn
of 1946 stated:
We have been prepared to discuss a similar
contract with any other country which has been a cus-
tomer for a reasonable quantity of our wheat. V.'e
have discussed the possibilities with a number but
up to date no other country has definitely proposed
a contract.
1
The contract between Canada and the United Kingdom was
supported by farm organizations in general but there was a
considerable amount of disagreement on the part of the Par-
2liamentary Opposition, a large sector of the press and many
Individual farmers.
The Minister of Agriculture defended the agreement vigor-
ously but his defence in the outset was clearly based on an
anticipated decline in the world price of wheat and also to
the advantage which he attached to price stability. In a
speech made in the House of Commons on August 14, 1946, Imme-
diately after tho Agreement had become effective, these points
were Indicated.
When we are at the end of the four-year period,
if in the last six or twelve months we find our-
selves in the position that world markets, so-called,
are not offering as much for wheat as we are getting
for it, I hope people will stand behind us to the
extent they are standing behind us now. Even if
wheat stays above $1.55 during the whole period, I
1
From correspondence with an official of the Caradian
Wheat Pool who has asked that his name be withheld.
Hansard, House of Commons Debate, p. 1055.
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hope people will still feel that it was worth while
trying. If we are successful in this experiment,
then we can talk to the grain trade people with
some assurance. If they are able to show us at the
end of the five-year period that we were all wrong,
that over that length of time the farmer got less
than he ever got before under similar circumstances
and that the other system would have brought him
more, then we shall be in a position to discuss the
matter with them on an even footing. I am sure
anyone who has taken this position and finds himself
wrong will be quite prepared to discuss it from that
point of view. In the meantime we are convinced that
this is the best thing for the farmer. As long as we
are convinced of that, and having another four years
in which to try it out, we can put the policy into
effect in a way that will at least help us to determine
how this lone argument between farmer and grain trade
in western Canada ought to be settled in the interests
of the great masses of the people. 1
Mr. Gardiner thus made his position clear that he was pre-
pared to defend the agreement on the basis that it would re-
sult in a greater net return to the farmer for his wheat or
failing that, would provide a degree of price stability which
would compensate the farmer for some loss in total revenue.
However, he places the responsibility on the grain trade to
establish, at the end of the agreement, that the price re-
ceived was something leas than might otherwise have been
obtained.
Prom the outset the Wheat Pools were stanohly in favor of
2the scheme. Less sympathetic opinions, however, existed in
other quarters. As evidence of this a statement is included
from the results of a survey of farmer opinion conducted by the
„ Hansard, House of Commons Debate, p. 4810.
The Alberta Wheat Pool, "The Stoiy of the Wheat Pool",
p. 11.
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Country Guide in the late summer of 1947. On the basis of
approximately 1,000 questionnaires concerning the agreement,
returned by subscribers of that magazine, the following ob-
servation was made.
Thus, 56 percent of the definite opinions offered,
and 53 percent of all wheat growers supplying returns,
were, on the whole, dissatisfied with the agreement,
believinc that it is not likely to prove a satisfac-
tory deal for prairie farmers. 1
What actually was the outcome of the agreement? The
agreement provided, in clause 2 (b), for the negotiation, at
a future date, of the price to be paid in the last two years.
It was observed in a footnote to the copy of the agreement in-
cluded above, that the price in each of the last two years was
fixed at §2.00 per bushel. Official statements were issued by
the Government following each negotiation. Concerning the
1948 crop, a press release setting forth the arrangement was
Issued by the late Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King on
October 1, 1947 and reads in part:
The Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, made the
following announcement: 'A Wheat price of |2.00 per
bushel for the third year of the Canada-United King-
dom wheat contract has been agreed upon by the gov-
ernments of Canada and the United Kingdom.
In the negotiations which took place during the
past month both parties recognized the obligation
contained in clause 2 (b) of the agreement, which
requires that in settling the ;.rice to be paid in the
last two years of the agreement period regard should
be had to the difference In the first two years be-
tween the world prices and the agreement price. Hav-
ing in mind the magnitude of the agreement and the long
The Country Guide, November 1947, p. 43.
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term security which it provides, a precise
arithmetical calculation of the difference in
price was not suggested. The government is sat-
isfied that the considerations which have prompted
the United Kingdom government to offer and the
Canadian government to accept a price of f»2.00 per
bushel in 1948-49, will apply, fully and in the
same spirit, in the negotiations for the settle-
ment of the price to be paid in 1949. The nego-
tiations for this purpose are to take place bo-
fore the end of 1948". 1
Discussions on the payment to be made for the 1949 crop
were carried on in December, 1948, between Mr. Gardiner rep-
resenting Canada and Mr. Strachey and Sir Stafford Cripps
representing the United Kingdom. A price of $2.00 per bushel
was agreed to by both parties but further consideration was
to be given at a later date, at which time a price adjustment
might be made. The press release issued on January 20, 1949
reads as follows:
The government made the following announcement
today
:
Representatives of the United Kingdom and
Caiadian governments have had discussions on the
price to be naid by the United Kingdom for Canadian
wheat in 1949-50, the fourth and final year under
She United Kingdom-Canadian wheat agreement of
1S»4<5. After taking into account all relevant con-
siderations, including but without attempting to
reach a final settlement of the United Kingdom
obligations under clause 2 (b) of the agreement,
the two governments have agreed upon a price of
$2.00 per bushel.
The two governments have also agreed that
their representatives shall meet not "later than
31st, July, 1950, to settle any obligations of the
United Kingdom which may then still be outstanding
under clause 2 (b) of the agreement.
Hansard, House of Commons Debates, p. 1064.
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The extent to which any such obligations
will remain will depend largely upon the actual
price ruling for wheat during 1949-50.1
However, the discussions were in fact closed with that
meeting. The Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Howe,
while in London in May, 1950 on other business, was advised by
Sir Stafford Cripps that the United Kingdom felt no further
g
obligation under the wheat agreement. The first reaction on
the part of the Canadian Government to this development was one
of considerable annoyance. However, it was recognized that if
the United Kingdom Government chose to take that stand nothing
could be done about it. The agreement was not written in such
terras as would permit enforcement. Canada did suggest to the
United Kingdom Government that a further payment of $65 million
might be made since that amount of money remained unused in a
loan which Canada had previously made to the United Kingdom.
The latter refused to do this, and in fact, cancelled the re-
4
malnder of the loan. The crux of the disagreement was
apparent in the wording of clause 2 (b). As was no doubt
recognized by Sir Stafford Cripps in reaching a decision for
the United Kingdom and which was no doubt recognized later by
Mr. Gardiner, the agreement declared that in determining a
price in the two final years, 1948-1949 and 1949-1950 consid-
eration would be given to the world price which ruled during
Hansard, loc . clt.
2 Ibid., p.~I065.
3 Loc . clt .
4 iETd., p. 1067.
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the first two years, 1946-1947 and 1947-1948 when the price
was fixed at $1.55 per bushel. So far as clause 2 (b) of the
Agreement was concerned the world price ruling in 1949-1950
had nothing to do with the price which would be fixed between
Canada and the United Kingdom.
On Friday, March 2, 1951, the Canadian Government announced
that it would contribute $65 million to the five year pool,
"because they did not think the settlement was as high as it
should be." 1-
With that the matter was closed between the two govern-
ments without acrimony.
Both prior to and subsequent to the final settlement a
diversity of opinions had been expressed as to the merits of
the Canada-United Kingdom Wheat Agreement. Several of these
opinions were considered worth including. It must be kept in
mind that the agreement under consideration was only or.e of
three distinct outlets for wheat accumulated in the fiv? year
compulsory pool. The amount of wheat handled by the pool was
1,435,955,510 bushels of which 631,552,419 bushels were sold
to the United Kingdom under the agreement for a total amount of
$1,089, 889, 013. 2
When Mr. Gardiner announced the signing of the Canada-
United Kingdom agreement he challenged the grain trade to prove,
at the end of the period, that the farmer had received less
Loc . cit .
2 Ibid., p. 1060.
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than he would have received under similar circumstances and
another marketing system (p. 50-51). The grain trade has
since taken up that challenge and the statement of an official
of the grain-trade is given:
During the first two years 1946-47 and 1947-48,
of this bilateral contract the world market price,
with a high of $3.45, averaged around $2.60 so that
more than £1.00 per bushel was lost to Canadian
farmers on all wheat delivered during that period.
Agreement at a price of "2.00 was reached for 1948-49
and 1949-50, also much lower than the market and fur-
ther losses have accrued since.
The last year under wartime oontrol, 1945-46,
was pooled along with the four British contract years
and I had figures compiled by a prominent Canadian
statistical service, covering the crop years 1945-46
to the end of 1948-49 which showed that on the average
half section, the Canadian farmer received at his
country elevator at an average Saskatchewan point,
south of Regina, about $1,000.00 less each year than
his American neighbor operating the same size farm -
or about 50 cents per bushel less on every bushel
marketed since the end of the war. The 3tory of last
year's experience, 1949-50, differs little from the
others, but in having figures compiled, I was impelled,
because of claims of farm leaders that American prices
were not world prices, to have comparisons made be-
tween the cash returns received by Canadian producers
and the price which countries, outside the agreements,
have paid for Canadian wheat, a price set each day by
the government monopoly, the Canadian V.heat Board. The
fact that this price la so set should satisfy my critics
that it is authentic, but everyone in the grain trade
knows that it is based on the price of wheat on the
open markets of the United States.
It was found that last year's discrepancy was 44
cents per bushel.
A new computation, accepting the farm leaders
'
premise, and based upon the .Vheat Board's official
world price for the full five years was even more
devastating. The previous figure of loss was es-
timated to be 680 million dollars . Taking the 'Wheat
Board's figures this was increased to 751 millions,
but what's another 70 million in these days of
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astronomical calculations, particularly when It has
gone down the drain, never to be recovered.
The case made by this official, Mr. S. N. Jones, was no
doubt the best that could be made in respect to the challenge
offered by Mr. Gardiner in 1946. The statement does not attempt
to prove that the farmers received less than they ever got be-
fore under similar circumstances, but it does attempt to prove
that the farmers would have received more for their wheat un-
der a different marketing system and during the period of time
in question. Thl3 attempted proof was based on a comparison
between the price received under the Agreement and the world
price. The expression 'world price' was used in the Agreement
but it was not defined. Mr. Gardiner referred to 'offerings
in the world market', but did not elaborate further as to where
that market was to be found. The challenge was, therefore,
difficult to meet in that respect.
Mr. Jones made a comparison on the basis of the price
which the Canadian farmer received in comparison with what the
American farmer received during the five year period in question.
This comparison is not considered parallel since the government
support program in that country has, no doubt, influenced the
price. In 1942 prior to the closing of the Winnipeg Grain
Exchange, while the Canadian wheat price remained at the 70
cent floor price, Chicago May wheat futures were quoted as high
Jones, Unpublished address delivered at the Annual Con-
vention of the Farmers' Elevator Association of South Dakota,
Huron, South Dakota, December 4, 1950.
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aa $1.29 3/4. 1
This fact does not prove that the price of wheat In
Canada would have been less than In the United States under
similar circumstances, that is the open market system, nor
does it prove that the price of wheat in Canada would have
been higher than it was in recent year3 in tha absence of
the Agreement.
A comparison between the price received under tha Agreement
and that received for wheat exported elsewhere than to the
United Kingdom was also made in Mr. Jones' statement, but this
comparison may be questioned also. The quantity of wheat, upon
which this price was established was a comparatively small per-
centage of the total saleable wheet in Canada. It was noted
that out of 1,435,955,510 bushels of wheat handled by the Board,
631,552,419 were involved in the Agreement. Some 200 million
bushels were sold in the domestic market leaving some 600
million available for sale elsewhere. Not only was a sub-
stantial portion of the product in question gone from the mar-
ket, but so were the largest buyers, the United Kingdom and
domestic purchasers. The market, under these circumstances,
was quite different than it otherwise would have been, and no
doubt the price was quite different also. To say that the
price established from day to day by the Wheat Board during the
period of the Canada-United Kingdom .vheat Agreement would have
been the same in the absence of the Agreement is a statement
The Wheat Pool Budget, November 3, 1950.
* Ibid ., June 8, 1951.
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which is subject to question. The fact of the matter seems to
be that there is no current price against which the price in
the Agreement may be compared, and if that be the case, Mr.
Gardiner's challenge is a difficult one to meet.
The Canadian Wheat Pools which had defended the Agreement
in the outset, wero dissatisfied with the final payment. A
brief was presented to a committee of the Dominion Cabinet
on November 28, 1950 in which their dissatisfaction was ex-
plained. The salient points of that brief are in connection
with clause 2 (b), and In that regard a statement from a speech
delivered in Winnipeg on February 25, 1947, by Mr. John Strachey,
British Minister of Pood,, is quoted in the brief:
Now these words (clause 2 (b) mean neither
more nor lass than they say. They mean that
the fact that we have bought our wheat from you
this year below world prices - and that we may do
so again next year - will be one of the factors
in negotiating the actual price to be paid in
the third and fourth year. I, and my Government,
and I am quite sure that this applies also to the
Canadian Government, would resist any attempt to
add to or to subtract from this clear and definite
statement as written into Paragraph 2, Sub section
(b) of the Wheat Agreement.
In the same speech, as pointed out in the Wheat Pool
brief, Mr. Strachey referred to the fact that a floor price
for wheat, delivered in the third ai-i fourth years, was pro-
vided in the Acreement at i'1.25 for the third year and $1.00
for the fourt.i year.
In regard to this fact Mr. Strachey is quoted further:
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I have heard it aliased that if the world
price of wheat fell heavily so that we in Britain
could buy our wheat elsewhere at far less than the
floor price fixed under the agreement—that in that
event the British Government would refuse to pay the
floor prices and so let down the Canadian farmer.
1 should like to say here and now, that this la an
utterly unwarranted suggestion. It is monstrous to
suggest that any British Government would ever break
the terms of a solemn agreement such as this. And
in this I am quite sure that I speak for the Con-
servative opposition in the British House of Com-
mons as well as for my own Government.
And later in the speech Mr. Strachey said:
And I reiterate thpt it is an inescapable
obligation of the British Government to pay at
least those prices, hov.over low the worlc price
of wheat may go. So I trust that we shall hear
no more of a suggestion which, to put it plainly,
calls in question the honour of the British
Government.
fcb the full knowledge of what transpired in the two years
following Mr. Strachey's speech in Winnipeg, which points have
been included below, the Wheat Pool brief reached the rather
astonishing conclusion quotedj
The conclusion which we draw from this statement
(Mr. Strachey's immediately preceding) is that if in
the event of prices declining, the undertaking to
live up to minimum floor prices of $1.25 and $1.00 in
the third and fourth years of the Agreement is—"an
inescapable obligation of the British Government to
pay at least those prices however low the world price
of wheat may go"—then it is equally "an Inescapable
obligation" in the event of prices going higher, that
the British Government should live up to the obli-
gation to Canadian wheat growers contained in Clause
2 (b) of the Agreement and as interpreted by Mr.
Strachey in his speech at Winnipeg.
It should be recalled that the price of wheat under the
agreement was raised to §2.00 per bushel in each of the two
final years. Thi3 was done in the final year in spite of
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Clause 7 which provided that the Agreemont would be adjusted
to conform with any international wheat arrangements which
might become effective during the course of the Agreement in
question. The International Wheat Agreement was in effect
during the final year and a maximum price of $1.80 was provided
therein. Notwithstanding this fact §2.00 was paid, as has been
pointed out, under the Canada-United Kingdom Agreement. It
would therefore appear that full regard was given to Clause 2
(b).
However, the situation which the Wheat Pools considered
reasonable was that Britain should be prepared to pay a min-
imum price regardless of how low the price went but that no
maximum price shoul'". prevail if the reverse situation existed.
This attitude would prohibit any long term agreement since the
possibility of risk must lie equally with both parties.
The Government defended the Agreement ad sound, and in
the interest of the Canadian farmer. It was declared that the
Agreement was necessary for the successful accomplishment of
the five year pool. The price received under the Agreement
has been defended with particular regard to the final year in
which '&2.00 per bushel was received. In reference to that price
Mr. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce ,made this statement:
In the circumstances then prevailing, .2.00
plus five to six cents carrying charges lookod like
a good price for 140,000,000 bushels of wheat, and I
think it was a good price at which to sell such sub-
stantial quantities of wheat, particularly as the
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United Kingdom at that time anticipated that the
international wheat agreement price would be $1.70
per bushel and that wheat could be purchased from
countries other than Canada for the international
agreement price.
^
This explanation was probably satisfactory to those who
consider the International Wheat Agreement a sound policy but
for the most part members of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange are
not in that group.
Since the Canada-United Kingdom agreement was closely
associated with the five year pool, several other points con-
cerning the agreement were included with the discussion of the
pool.
An Appraisal of the Five Year Pool
The objective of the post-war wheat policy established by
the Canadian Government, as set out in an official statement
(p. 43), was price stability at a reasonable level. To accom-
plish this, particularly In view of the large percentage of
Canadian wheat which must find a market in foreign trade, the
prioe must be competitive. In order for a price to be compet-
itive consideration must be given not only to the level of that
price but also the availability of the necessary foreign ex-
change on the part of the buyer. When the latter Is in short
supply an additional premium is therefore placed upon it, and
C. D. Howe, Unpublished address delivered at Ottawa,
March 12, 1951.
I
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to regain a competitive position some downward adjustment in
price may be necessary. J'.ost of Canada's exportable wheat must
be disposed of in the non-dollar areas . At the close of World
V/ar II» these areas were faced with a critical shortage of
dollar currency, and it was, therefore, necessary for them to
curtail dollar purchases as much as possible. It is within the
range of possibility that traditional purchasers of Canadian
wheat might have turned elsewhere than to the dollar area for
their wheat supplies, thus conserving their dollars for the
purchase of products which could not be purchased elsewhere.
It was possible, and Indeed was true, later, that wheat im-
porters paid higher prices for wheat which could be purchased
with non-dollar currency, with which they were more adequately
supplied.
If this situation had developed slgnifioantly it is pos-
sible that Canada would have been left a residual supplier of
wheat and been faced with a surplus. Had wheat become a sur-
plus commodity in Canada the price would certainly have fallen
and the stability sought would have been near impossible to
attain, and if attained it would have been at considerable ex-
pense in the form of government price support.
To prevent such an eventuality wheat was offered for sale
in 1945 at the comparatively low price of $1.55 per bushel
(p. 44). At a later date It wa3 found necessary to provide loans
Hansard, op_. cit. , p. 1090.
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to non-dollar areas, one of which was a loan to Britain In the
amount of | 1,250 million. Suoh loans were a charge on the
Dominion Treasury and thence on the Canadian taxpayer. The
higher the price of the commodity purchased with the loan, the
greater the loan must be for the same size of transaction. This
faot suggests a weakness in the arguments presented by those who
have calculated the loss suffered under the Canada-United
Kingdom Wheat Agreement. For the portion of that sale financed
by loans, the loss In question can only be the difference be-
tween what the taxpayer contributed to the loan and what he
might have contributed had the- price of wheat been higher.
One of the points raised in defense of the five year pool
in the statement quoted from the Winnipeg Free Press (p. 44-45)
is associated with the discussion at hand. It was suggested
that had Canada charged higher prices, wheat importing countries
would have been encouraged to expand their wheat production,
thus reducing the size of the market for imported wheat. Such
a situation is not without an historical precedent. Following
World War I, the high cost of Imported wheats was partly
responsible for encouraging home production through the use of
protective tariffs in some European countries. The case of
France, Italy and Germany is cited. During the five year period
1922 to 1926, France Imported an average of 55.4 million bushels
of wheat, Germany 59.4 million buahals irJ Ttaly 85.8 million
Howe, 0£. clt .
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bushels. In the five year period Immediately folio* ng, 1927
to 1931 i France imported an average of 51.1 million bushels
,
Germany 5S.6 million and Italy 66.3 million. From 1932 to
1936 France imported an average of 13.9 million bushels, Ger-
many, 9«4 million bushels and Italy 18.5 million. The decreases
in imports noted were not associated with significant decreases
in consumption. Total consumption during the period 1922 to
1926 averaged 328.8 million bushels in France, 169.2 million
bushels in Germany and 288.3 million bushels in Italy. From
1927 to 1931, France consumed an average of 329.5 million
bushels, Germany 190.9 million and Italy 299.1 million and again
in the years from 1932 to 1937 average consumption per year was
323.4 million bushels in Prance, 186.5 million in Germany and
280.7 million in Italy. 1
The actual financial arrangements which accompanied the
movement of wheat during the five year pool period indicate
the abnormality of the time and lend some strength to arguments
which favored government interference and the use of a five
year pool. The case has been made by the Canadian Government
that in the absence of the five year compulsory pool the Canada-
United Kingdom Agreement would have been impossible to negotiate,
and in the absence of the Agreement, the financial difficulties
would have been intensified. During the orop years 1946-1947
Paul de Hevesy, World Itheat Planning and Economic Planning
in General , p. 751-767.
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and 1947-1948 loans in the amount of $3,750 million were made
by the United States and fl,250 million by Canada to the United
Kingdom. These loans were used, in part, for the purchase of
wheat. In spite of the size of these loans they were approach-
ing depletion when the European Recovery Program of the United
States became operative in 1947. So far as Canada was con-
cerned the granting of the loan referred to, disturbed the
foreign exchange situation in Canada to the extent that rigid
exchange control measures had to be employed. In other words,
Canada had loaned to the extent of her ability; no further loan
was possible without running the risk of unbalancing the do-
mestic economy. It was also true that Britain, without dollar
aid, found it very difficult to make payments in the dollar
areR. The ERP aid to Britain at that time was very important
to both Britain and Canada.
Prom 1947 to 1949 the United States permitted
Marshall aid (ERP) funds to be used for the purchase
of Canadian wheat, and though large stocks of wheat
were accumulating In the United States that gov-
ernment respected the United Kingdom-Canada agree-
ment and did not demand that the Marshall aid funds
be used to purchase United States wheat instead of
Canadian wheat.*
This statement does not prove that ERP aid funds would
not have been available for the purchase of Canadian wheat had
the agreement not been in existence but the following quotation
suggests that both the United States and Britain were more
Howe, 0£. clt .
t Loc . cit .
Loc. clt.4t^
-sis.
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favorably disposed to the Canadian market because the Agree-
ment was in existence.
However, before the 1949 crop came on the mar-
ket United States wheat was declared in surplus sup-
ply, which automatically stopped the use of Marshall
aid funds to buy Canadian wheat. Just think of the
importance of that agreement during those years.
Because of the agreement, the United States paid money
to Canada for supplying wheat to Britain, instead of
giving away her own surplus wheat to England, at a
time when the surplus In the United States was be-
coming burdensome. Those who are making up the
equation to show losses might very well put In that
intangible for a very considerable price indeed.
Passing on now to the 1948-1949 crop year which
was the third year of the contract, producers will
receive $1.83 for deliveries of 293,000,000 bushels.
Throughout this crop year the payment difficulties
of the United Kingdom continued acute. To put It
bluntly what we faced here In Canada was the very
real possibility that the United States would drive
Canadian wheat out of our traditional markets. This
actually occurred in the European markets with the
exception of the United Kingdom, and the fact is
that the Canada-United Kingdom wheat agreement was
of the greatest value at this time in retaining
our position In the United Kingdom market.
As a matter of fact we have a very serious problem
ahead of us in regaining markets in continental Europo
which are now being supplied by the United States under
Marshall aid. It was for that reason the government
sent a mission to Europe last year for the express pur-
pose of finding out how to regain a foothold In some
of those markets.
What the Canada-United Kingdom wheat agreement
actually accomplished was to enable us to hold our
position In the United Kingdom market. The United
States Government respected the agreement, and in
fact went so far as to provide a very substantial
amount of United States dollars, $175,000,000 to
be exact, which enabled the United Kingdom to finance
her wheat purchases from the 1949 wheat crop under
the agreement. This amount was provided as the re-
sult of negotiations which took place in Washington
early in September, 1949.
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(At tlila point Kr. Howe quoted from a letter
of September 13, 1949, from Paul G. Hoffman, E. C. A.
administrator to U. 3. Agriculture Secretary Charles
Brannan in which Hoffman said that to help end the
drain on British dollar and gold reserves, the U. S.
would make $175,000,000 available to finance part of
British wheat purchases in Canada* Hoffman also told
Brannan that this action was in the interest of B. S.
farmers since it would facilitate export of other
farm products both to Canada and the 0. K.)
In weighing the losses under the agreement, let
them weigh in the $175,000,000 supplied by the Gov-
ernment in the United States to pay Canada for wheat
shipped to Britain, which it is very probable Britain
could not have bought without that assistance. Inci-
dentally that assistance waa barred under the strict
terms of the Marshall aid plan. 1
The point which has been suggested in this statement ia
that the United Kingdom demand for wheat was tied to the
Canadian market because of the Agreement. In the absence of
the Agreement the United Kingdom's requirements might have
been supplied by the United States. No evidence was given,
however, that the United Kingdom requirements could have
been met in the United States 1 market without reducing that
country's committments elsewhere. It is further suggested
that in the absence of the Agreement $175 million which Mr.
Hoffman recommended be made available for United Kingdom pur-
chases of wheat in Canada would not have been made available.
While complete information was not available on this point
there did not seem to be complete evidence that the amount of
money in question was made available because of the Agreement.
It could well be that Mr. Hoffman was only concerned with having
Loc. clt.
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the United Kingdom supplied with wheat, that wheat was avail-
able in Canada and likely would have been used even if the
price had been the same as wheat available from other sources
.
However, if it was on the basis of the Agreement that the
United States Government was induced to lend money to the
United Kingdom for Canadian wheat purchases, then the Agree-
ment was indeed important, because without United States' dol-
lar aid the United Kingdom would have either had to curtail its
use of wheat or have looked to the non-dollar area for it»
supply.
An additional piece of evidence that the Government wheat
monopoly, the five year pool, and the pricing system which it
made possible, was useful is given in this statements
It is well to keep in mind that our second
market in pre-war days was the Netherlands; and
I may tell hon. gentlemen that we have hardly
sold a bushel of wheat to the Netherlands since the
war ended. Our next biggest market was Belgium.
Belgium has supported our wheat, has bought sizeable
quantities in the post-war years, for the reason
that their supply of U. S. dollars was somewhat
better than other countries. Italy was a great
market. V/e are just now getting back into the
Italian market in something like a substantial way,
but there are other markets, which we have lost
entirely for the reason that they were quite
happy to buy wheat from the United States with
E. C. A. funds. 1
The point made herein has weight. If Canada is to sell
wheat in the European market some compensation must be made
in price for what is lacked in the ease of obtaining the
necessary foreign exchange.
Loc. clt.
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The demand for a commodity in a particular market is
assumed to include not only the willingness, but the ability
to buy. It is in connection with the ability to buy that the
Government case, so far considered, has been concerned* This
lack of ability to buy which has existed in the tradional
markets for Canadian wheat in recent years is an abnormal sit-
uation and an outgrowth of World War II. So long as the ab-
normal condition exists then abnormal methods may be used to
counter it. These abnormal methods have been the use of loans
from various sources to finance the movement of Canadian
wheat to the Kuropean market. The question immediately arises
as to how long can the lack of foreign exchange in the
European market be considered an abnormality and at what point
of time must it be considered the new condition of normalcy.
It would seem that if at any time up to the conclusion of the
period under consideration, the lack of foreign exchange had
been considered the new condition of normalcy, then the portion
of European supplies of wheat, which Canada had provided,
would have had to come at least in part from elsewhere. The
market for Canadian wheat would thus have been substantially
reduced, and it is questionable if price stability at a sat-
isfactory level could have been achieved.
It has been claimed that the various concessions made
during the difficult period have saved the market for Canadian
wheat. In support of this claim the Government has cited the
arrangements made for the 1950-1951 crop year, the first follow-
ing, the termination of the Agreement.
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Both governments have now reviewed the results
of those talks* They are agreed that the International
wheat agreement removes the need for a contract to
replace the existing Anglo-Canadian wheat agreement whloh
expires at the end of July (1950)
•
The United Kingdom government has made it clear
that out of its total Import requirements in 1950-
51, it expects to buy a large proportion in Canada
which, quite apart from the special contractual
arrangements for the past four years, is, and it is
hoped will remain, the traditional source of supply for
the United Kingdom. The Canadian government, for its
part, is satisfied that Canadian wheat growers will
continue to find in the United Kingdom a mnrket for a
very substantial part of their exportable wheat. 1
In Mr. Gardiner's original statement on the five year pool
plan, he suggested that the price of wheat, presumably in the
world market, might remain above the $1.55 level, which was
thought might prevail throughout the five year period. Pre-
sumably he considered that some value could be attached to a
price which remained constant over a period, to one which
varied, in spite of the possibility that the latter would re-
sult in a greater total return. The Government has persis-
tently laid claim to the value of this form of stability In
defending the five year pool and the various schemes arranged
thereunder. Precedent for this opinion was found in the Re-
port of the Royal Grain Inquiry Commission of 1931, which in-
vestigated the effects of futures trading on price.
These differences in the violence of fluctuation
may have a material economic effect upon the property
of the farmer, and the range of fluctuation has,
therefore, been a very Important subject for our
attention.
Hansard, £p_. clt ., p. 1066.
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It has been put forward, for example, that if
the range of fluctuation is reduced by futures trad-
ing it might even be worthwhile for the farmer to
have a lower general average than otherwise, for
the one advantage might more than compensate for the
other disadvantage. 1
The price during the five year pool was the same for all
wheat deliveries of equivalent grade made throughout the five
years. That is the payments from all sales were pooled and
the price received by the farmer was this total amount divided
by the total deliveries. This system resulted in higher pay-
ments in some years than might otherwise have been the case
and was claimed as an advantage in a Government statement:
As a result of the five-year pool producers
are receiving $1.83 a bushel basis No. i Northern,
on all deliveries of about 235,000,000 bushels
during the 1945-1946 crop year. The final payment
is 28.3 cents over the export price of $1.55 which
remained in effect during that year, and is well
above the open market price in other countries.
The average price received on the farm in the United
States during the 1945-1946 crop year was £1.49 a
bushel. The man who grew wheat and marketed it in
this pool in 1945-1946 did not lose very much.
Obviously he gained 28 cents per bushel over any
other method of marketing."
It might, however, be claimed by those who had marketed
wheat in the later years of the pool, that if they were not
also marketers in the first year, 1945-1946, that the gain
claimed in the Government statement was their loss. There
was no evidence of that claim having been made.
Report of the Commission to Enquire into Trading in
Grain futures, 1931, p. 9.
* Howe, 0£. clt .
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Also in connection with price stability the Government
has laid further claim to the advantages resulting from the
pool and Canada-United Kingdom Agreement:
The five year pool and the British Agreement
were an experiment in long-term stability. They
were entered into at a time of uncertainty at
t o end of World aar II
•
This statement later continues in the same regard:
Everyone recognized that there were risks in
such an agreement. There were risks on both sides.
But it must never be forgotten that there mere even
greater risks in not entering into the agreement.
The advantage of the agreement was that it minimized
the risk. The wheat agreement was similar to an in-
surance policy. Because a man who buys an accident
policy never claims under it does not mean the policy
should not have been taien out, or that the premiums
should not have been paid. It is well to keep that
in mind. If wheat prices in the last two years had
fallen very substantially, the shoe would have been
on the other foot, and I do not think it would have
been proper for the United Kingdom to ask us to
accept less than the floor prices provided in the
agreement in order to reduce average returns to
the open market level.
The have regard to clause (Claude 2 (b) is
important but it did not mean, and we have never
argued that it meant, that the United Kingdom
should make up in the final two years any mathe-
matical calculation of losses in the first two
years. 1
The idea of an insurance premium is a useful one in con-
nection with long term agreements. For those who felt that
tho possibility of a decline in the price of wheat following
World War II was a serious threat, the premium of possible
losses suffered under the pool arrangement was no doubt a reason-
able one. It would appear from the V/heat Pool brief (p. 60)
1 Loc. cit.
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that that organization was not prepared to pay the premium
demanded
•
The five year pool, originally intended to Include the
crop years 1945-1946 through 1949-1950, was terminated on
July 31, 1950. An amendment to the Wheat Board Act, introduced
on March 8, 1951, removed the possibility of any long term
pooling; operation in the immediate future. However, the
Canadian Wheat Board remained the sole marketing agency, pre-
sumably as the Canadian complement of the International Wheat
Agreement
.
CONSIDERATION OP A FUTURE POLICY
In consideration of a future wheat marketing policy the
major concern was found to be the retention of an export mar-
ket. If wheat production is to survive as a major industry
in Canadian agriculture approximately two-thirds of the crop
must be disposed of outside of domestic trade. Brltnell and
Powke have analyzed the situation.
Prom a position of minor importance amonr Cana-
dian exports in 1900, wheat and wheat flour advanced
to first place by 1920. In the late 1920 's wheat
and wheat flour yielded one-third of the dollar value
of Canadian exports. Over the ten years 1929 to 1938
annual wheat exports averaged 200 million bushels.
Throughout the second World war the average was 259
million bushels. Though Canadian farmers produce leas
than 10 percent of the world wheat supply, their
Hansard, o£. clt ., p. 1051.
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exports—approximately two-thirds of their produc-
tion—accounted for from 35 to 40 percent of the
world trade in wheat in the late inter-war years.
^
The question could be raised as to whether there was some
other use to which part of the land used for wheat production
could be put, thus reducing the high degree of dependence on
the export market. Mr. Justice Turgeon felt that there was
no other comparatively good use. He suggests that much of
the land would have to revert to grazing or the production
of some rye and oats. He also makes the more important point,
as was suggested by Britnell and Powke, that the sale of wheat
is an Important source of foreign exchange. "It has abundant-
ly been shown in this report that in the past no commodity
has contributed more than wheat to the wealth and the export
trade of the country."3
With this fact in mind a domestic marketing policy must be
found which will facilitate the flow of Canadian wheat into
world trade and will at the same time result in as high as
possible a return to the producer and avoid wide price fluc-
tuation.
During this study it was found that several marketing
systems have been used, each had its particular merits and also
certain weaknesses. These marketing systems have beon classi-
fied as follows:
g
Britnell aa d Powke, op_. cit, p. 627.
, Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 190.a Ibid
., p. 189.
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(1) A compulsory pool or government wheat monopoly with no
open market system.
(2) An open market system.
(3) Voluntary pooling with an open market system In oper-
ation.
(4) Government price stabilization and an open market
system in operation.
(5) A government floor price in conjunction with an open
market system.
Each of these five systems has been considered in relation
to how well it lent lt.self to the export trade and also the
level of price returned to the producer thereunder. The de-
gree of price stability was a third consideration. Other merits
and weaknesses were also considered.
A Compulsory Pool
It was observed that a compulsory pool wa3 in operation
during the crop year 1919-1920 and again from 1943-1944 to the
conclusion of the period considered, 1949-1950. It can be
said that during these periods export trade was at a high
level, however, it must be recalled that these were periods
of general world wheat shortage en.d so far as the latter period
is concerned, one in which rather abnormal financial arrange-
ments were used. So far a3 price stability is concerned there
can certainly be no quarrel. The price remained constant for
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equivalent grades during the 1919-1920 crop year and was
again constant during the two crop years 1943 to 1945 and
constant at a higher level for the five crop years between
1945 to 1950.
There was no evidence found of dissatisfaction, but quite
the reverse, with the price level, $2.63 per bushel, in 1919-
1920, Considerable dissatisfaction however seems to have ex-
isted with the price level in the entire period from 1943 to
1950. While some evidence was found in support of claims that
the price received between 1945 and 1950, $1.83 per bushel, was
as good as could have bean obtained, nevertheless, some farmers
were dissatisfied and in this respect the system could be said
to have been less than perfectly satisfactory.
Practically all of the defence of this system is asso-
ciated with the abnormality of the periods in which it was
used (p. 62-74). In examining a policy for the future it cannot
be said that world conditions will remain continuously abnor-
mal. If the condition of normalcy which prevails in the future
is one in which importing countries choose to continue bulk
buying, as was true during both war periods, and particularly
if they wish to project a bulk purchase contract into the future
for several years, then, in order to guarantee that contracts
be carried out, some government Interference with marketing
would seem to be necessary. If this interference takes the form
of a government monopoly in the exporting country, similar to
what Canada has used, a system of bilateral monopolies would
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then exist and thia situation is frought with dangers. Any-
major exporter could exert a very bullish effect on the mar-
ket, at least in the short run, by withholding supplies, and
a major importer, such as the United Kingdom, could exert a
very bearish effect on the market while bargaining for its
wheat requirements.
In the event that importing countries choose to abandon
government bulk trading and revert to a system of private
trading it would appear that private trading in exporting
countries would be the best complement to that development.
Mr. Turgeon points out that private traders in importing coun-
tries distrust and dislike monopoly and they would not be
anxious to contribute to their success.
It seems reasonable to assume that while a wheat monopoly
in Canada had some rather strong points to recommend it during
periods of stress, it would not be desirable for a system of
government to government trading to continue once the emergency
had ceased. A government selling agency dealing with private
Importers would be equally undesirable as suggested above.
Mr. Turgeon has suggested the harmful effects of polit-
ical interference and criticism on a government board.
It is perhaps impossible to exclude any government
.appointed body from public criticism; but the fact
that the members of such a body will sometimes believe
and feel that the criticism to which thsy are subjected
is unfair, and of a nature to mislead those whom they
1 Ibid
., p. 135.
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are trying to serve, Is something that will surely
militate against the continued efficient perfor-
mance of their duties . All this is bad for the
producer. His interests are best served when pol-
itics are dissociated from his business •'
The question of a political i3sue arising from government
interference in marketing was real at the timo this study was
made.
The question is now becoming a political one and
it might develop that the government may change its
wheat marketing policy as a consequence. Opposition
leaders are taking full advantage of the situation to
criticize the government. 2
It has also been suggested that some shift of opinion in
regard to compulsory pooling has taken place among Canadian
farmers between the pool of 1919-1920 and that conducted during
and following World War II. Daring the Royal Grain Inquiry
Commission, 1933, all the farmer's organizations and a great
many individual farmers expressed a desire for a compulsory
government pool. However, according to the survey conducted
by the Country Guide (p. 51-52) a considerable body of oppo-
sition existed by 1947. Mr. Turgeon suggests the weakness of
a compulsory pool in relation to voluntary pooling.
The Pool officials were responsible only to men
who had Joined the organization voluntarily, who had
taken part in the appointment of the officials, and
who believed in the system. But the members of a
Board would be answerablg, not only to producers who
believe In a Board, but to the great number who do
not believe in it, who wish to be left to do their
own business, and who protest against what they con-
1 Ibid ., p. 188
2 From correspondence with a Canadian Vneat Pool executive
who asked that his name be withheld.
3 Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 185.
4 The Country Guide, loc . clt .
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aider to be high-handed government interference.
Some of these producers cave evidence before rne.^
An Open Market System
Professor John McDougall of Ojieens University* Kingston
has been an active supporter of the open market system, free
from any form of government interference.
This system would Include a number of private and co-oper-
ative oompanles and individuals, buying all of the grain of-
fered for sale by producers in any crop year, and they in turn
selling it in both the domestic and foreign markets. Each
company or individual operating independently and in his own
interest. The system would probably inolude a trading center
where both cash and futures transactions would be carried on.
The very Important function of price making would be performed
at the trading center rather than by bilateral arrangements
used in the compulsory pooling system.
Professor McDougall sights the period prior to 1914 as one
in which satisfactory development took place in the absence of
either voluntary or compulsory pooling. He states that, while
swings in price were wide prior to 1914, they were not unbear-
2
able. Prices at Winnipeg by five year averages during the
period in question show reasonable stability. From 1895-1899,
Royal Drain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 187.
2 Correspondence with Professor McDougall, May 18, 1951.
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76 cents per bushel; from 1900-1904, 79 cents; from 1905-
1909, 93 cents and from 1910-1914, 96 cents were the average
prices In each period. It can also be said that during that
time the export trade developed satisfactorily. Professor
MoDougall suggests that in the absence of interference with the
market this satisfactory situation would return. This view
however is shared by very few from whom Information has been
sought. Neither the Winnipeg Grain Exchange on the one hand
nor the Wheat P00I3 on the other was prepared to recommend this
system in the absence of some form of floor price. So far as
could be discovered the open market system with no government
assistance is not used in any major grain producing country.
It was considered that too many forces, external to the
farm, Influence price and thus make for instability. So far
as facilitating foreign trade, the open market system appeared
to have much to recommend it. The statement of an official
of the United Kingdom grain trade is cited:
The open market or competitive system, main-
tained a free flow of exports from Canada, and owing
to very active competition among Traders the spread
between producers' and consumers' prices was min-
imised. Owing to the "Futures" markets the "hedging"
system also permitted the export and import of Cana-
dian wheat at a minimized risk and cost.
2
Mr. Turgeon reached the following conclusion:
The competitive system ensured that Canadian Wheat
„ Bladen, op. clt ., p. 101.
Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 169.
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would at all times find Its saleable level in Inter-
national trade, enabling Traders to plan ahead. A
free market Is essential to United Kingdom Millars
in order that they may meet competition of overseas
exporters of flour •*
Further consideration of this system, modified to make
it more acceptable so far as the producer is concerned, was
included below.
Voluntary Pooling
It was shown above that voluntary pooling of wheat to the
large extent that that system was developed between 1923 and
1930 had a dilatory effect on foreign trade. This effect was
the result of withholding wheat from the market in an effort
to influence the price upwards, to what might be considered
a satisfactory level. While nothing in the statement of
Pool objectives listed above su^cested that such a policy
would be followed, it was agreed in evidence given to the
g
Royal Grain Inquiry Commission that Mr. Sapiro and others
had held out the picture of first organizing a Canadian Pool
and then an international Pool, and that this organization
could then go overseas and toll the consumers what to pay.
This attitude, once fi:ced, created an almost impossible
Loc. cit.
2 Aaron Sapiro, California attorney who figured prominent-
ly in the organization of Canadian Wheat Pools.
3 Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 84.
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position for those responsible for selling the pooled wheat.
Mr. Bredt, a wheat pool sales official, described the situa-
tion by saying that his department would have been liable to
very severe criticism if anything less than the highest market
prices had been accepted.
This point is raised, not to suggest that a voluntary pool-
ing system could not prove a useful part of a future marketing
system, but to suggest the main weakness of the pooling attempt
which has been made. That main weakness seems to have been the
size which approached a wheat monopoly. The Pools were too
large and this resulted in their having a false idea of their
strength, attempts to exercise this strength resulted in their
failure and serious damage to the export market.
It is suggested, however, that smaller pools, designed to
offer their members a price approaching an average of the many
day to day prices which prevail throughout any crop year would
perform a useful service. In this way a member would avoid
the risk of acceptinc a price which was much lower than aver-
age for that season if, either inadvertently or through nec-
essity, he sold his wheat when a low price prevailed. The mem-
ber would of course, forego the possibility of receiving the
highest or higher than average price by so doim> It has been
suggested above (p. 72) that some farmers are prepared to ac-
cept a lower average price than risk selling in a fluctuating
market.
1 Ibid., p. 79.
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A modest system of voluntary pooling would also provide
a system to which producers who, for some reason, had a dis-
taste for hedging and speculation, could turn. It is known
that there are some farmers who are so inclined.
This system could do no thine to harm export trade since
it would be a factor of similar size to ordinary private or
cooperative grain companies. This system, however, would not
provide any assurance of a satisfactory price level; that would
have to be provided for elsewhere in tho marketing system.
This suggestion was presented to an official of the Cana-
dian Wheat Pool and the reaction was not enthusiastic.
I do not think that a voluntary wheat pool could
be operated in Western Canada, and I am sure that no
farm organization will make an attempt to do so. A
few years ago the P00I3 and a few grain companies
operated voluntary pools but little grain was con-
tributed there to.
2
It is suggested, however, that the circumstances surround-
ing the operation of these pool3 was not oonducive to their
3 ccess. Operation was attempted between 1930 and 1934 imme-
diately after the Wheat Pool failure. Many farmers at that
time felt that anything the Pool received over and above the
initial payment made on deliveries would be used to retire the
huge Pool debt rather than make a further payment to the mem-
ber. This, however, was not the case. Another reason which
might be suggested for the lack of response to this pooling
1 Ibid ., p. 93.
2 prom correspondence with a Canadian Wheat Pool execu-
tive, 0£. cit .
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scheme was the extremely low prices which prevailed in those
years. Receiving an initial payment on 60 cent wheat had
little appeal to the farmer.
,
It was assumed that any voluntary pooling system of mod-
est size would operate within an open market systnis where the
price would be established by the forces of supply and demand.
Government Price Stabilization
It will be recalled that an attempt at price stabilization
was made by a government agency following the Wheat Pool fail-
ure of 1929-1930. This attempt, known as "stabilization
operations" ,was conducted under the direction of Mr. John I.
KcFarland. It has been contended that, at least as far as
price stability was concerned, the operation was a success.
Government action was taken in all important
wheat exporting and Importing countries in an
effort to save domestic producers from the effects
of disastrously low prices. This disorganized
world trade had resulted in the piling up of enormous
carry-ovors.
Mr. McFarland's operations resulted in much
higher prices for Canadian wheat than those ,
obtained by growers in Argentina and Australia.
The disorganization of world trade which was suggested
In the statement quoted was particularly severe so far as
Canada wa3 concerned. Evidence of thi3 was given in Tables
1, 2, 3 and 4.
Nesbitt, op_- cit . ,p. 38.
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The usefulness of 'stabilization operations', a system
of large government purchases in the market with the delib-
erate intention of influencing the price, is questionable.
The system did offer a reasonably stable price and a higher
one than might otherwise have prevailed, but it was accomplished
at the expense of a part of Canada's export market and there-
fore could only have short-run benefit. It could be said
that this policy has nothing to recommend it for use in the
future, since it has been said that the retention of the for-
eign market is the main consideration of a wheat policy. Mr.
Turgeon has pointed to this fact.
On the continent millers simply do without our
wheat when the price becomes relatively too high.
In all these cases, new connections are formed,
new grinding and baking mixtures are resorted to,
and the result is detrimental to our long run
interests. Everywhere, in the United Kingdom and
on the Continent, the truth was brought home to
us in almost the same terms: our wheat is grown
for export and must compete with other wheats in
a market which has become much restricted; the
buyer has the choice in these circumstances j he
can turn to other wheats.*
A Government Floor Price
The marketing system initiated by the Wheat Board Act of
1935 continued the open market system of selling but provided
for a floor price to be established annually. When the open
Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 157.
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market price declined below the floor price the Government
through its agency, the Canadian Wheat Board, stood ready to
buy wheat at the floor price and offer it immediately for sale
at the open market price. Any loss would be absorbed by the
Treasury. This was a significant departure from the preceding
system where government purchases were intended to influence
the price upward and the government would hope to sell its
purchases at this new higher level. A representative of the
British grain trade commented on these two systems.
In no circumstances do we recommend that the
"Open Market or Competitive System in Canada" should
not be maintained. If the Government of Canada put
some low bases price upon wheat—that is a domestic
matter. Any attempt to obtain something in the
nature of a subsidy, open or hidden, from Importing
Countries, is bound to fail.^
The marketing system initiated In 1935 allowed the open
market to operate without interference so far as the export
trade was concerned and therefore met the main requirement
suggested in the outset. When attention was turned to the
questions of providing a satisfactory price level and price
stability, new complications were apparent.
It was observed above (p. 33) that the Canadian VTheat
Board was impowerod to establish a floor price and losses
resulting thereunder could be transfered to the Dominion
Government. If the floor price so established were sufficient-
ly high a reasonable price level and a measure of stability
1
Ibid
., p. 171.
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would be provided. Before this policy can be considered a
permanent and reasonable solution to the difficulties which
beset the wheat producer these questions must be answered.
(1) On what basis can the transfer of public funds to one
industry be justified?
(2) In setting a floor price, how can a reasonable price
level be established without the charge on the Treasury being
excessive?
(3) Would losses incurred at one time be recovered from
the producer at 3ome later date?
Exponents of a floor price for wheat have defended this
policy as a measure of protection for the farmer against
eventualities over which he has no control. This statement
appears in the report of the Bracken commission:
The wheat Industry of western Canada -yhich finds
itself caught in the current of economic nationalism,
subsidized export competition and strangling inter-
national political forces over v/hich our producers
have no control, is entitled as an industry to re-
ceive from the nation as a whole, emergency price
assistance. 2
A further point has been offered in defense of a floor
price. It has been said that the tariff structure has
offered protection to secondary industry at the expense of
* A committee representin western agricultural interests
(1938-1939) under the chairmanship of Premier John Bracken
of Manitoba.
2 The Country Guide, April, 1939, p. 8.
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consumers in general. It was therefore contended that the
farmer was entitled to some return on this loss* by way of a
floor price.
A floor price » however , met considerable opposition in
o
many areas. The Financial Post, of August 51, 1939, referred
to the floor price as "the government price umbrella which has
3
sheltered wheat producers so snugly from risk or loss".
In considering the question of how high the floor price
may be, the method used by the Wheat Board must be recalled.
The Board was required to set a floor price at the beginning
of any crop year, and in the event that the market price foil
below this level, the Board stood ready to buy wheat at the
floor price and offer it for sale immediately at the market
price (p. 36). The risk of loss is apparent.
It has been recognized by most farm interests that this
risk must be kept to a minimum. The following statement sug-
gests that whatever formula is used to determine a floor price
must have regard to the risk.
Any government prepared to guarantee to the
Canadian farmer a price supported at a specific
level in relation to a fixed parity formula,
would be bound in self-defence to hold the support
level low enough to keep the element of risk to the
public treasury within limits which the public
treasury could stand and of which parliament and
tho people would approve.
*
Loo , clt.
2 pTnancial Post, Toronto, a weekly newspaper concerned
with Canadian business affairs.
* Tho Country Guide, October, 1940, p. 12.
The Country Guide, December, 1949, p. 45.
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There seems little doubt that the Canadian Wheat Board
was mindful of this problem In 1938. However, a loss of
$61.5 million resulted that year (p. 33) and strong pressure
was brought on the government to abandon the Board.
The possibility of heavy drains on the Dominion Treasury
and the political repercussions arising therefrom has caused
Professor McDougall to suggest that the floor price cannot be
more than what he refers to as a disaster cellar, which may
not be an acceptable price.
If you limit yourself to a floor price, which
is really a disaster cellar, I should expect that
the protection of such a price could be had without
giving up too much for it. But once you try to
make that a really acceptable price under normal
conditions the problem grows by leaps and bounds.
Much of the objection to a floor price at an acceptable
level would probably disappear if some system could be de-
vised whereby losses resulting from payment during one year
or series of years could be recovered from the producer at
some time in the future. It is possible that a tax of 5 to
10 percent could be made on all receipts in excess of the
floor price level, and the money thus accumulated used to
offset government losses during periods when the market price
was below the floor level. This system would constitute a
form of contributory insurance and therefore might prove
acceptable to wheat producers and the other elements of society
* The Country Guide, April, 1939, p. 8.
Correspondence with Professor McDougall, May 18, 1951.
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alike • At the same time a step would have been taken, to-
wards a permanent solution of the problem of price stability
at a reasonable level.
CONCLUSION
In this study an attempt has been made to review the
history of marketing grain in Canada and to point out some
of the difficulties which were apparent in each system used.
With these difficulties in mind, some consideration was given
to a futuro policy. In that regard the following statement is
aptt
Changes in and around the grain trade take place
so suddenly and drastically that it is difficult to
have the feeling that one is dealing with anything
finally. As an example of the recognized uncertainty
of the problems involved, the following statement
made by a witness in London may be quoted:
I am a member of a firm which has been for
99 years in the grain trade, although I have been
only 27 years in the trade. During that 99 years
the trade has had to be carried on according to
circumstances. I think it was Mr. Coyne who said
that you wanted to find out once and for all the
best way oi" marketing Canadian wheat. You cannot
find out anything once and for all; at least, I
do not think so. If you look back at the history
of tha grain trade, you will find that it has to
change with changed circumstances.
*
There is little doubt that circumstances will continue to
change. During times of extreme crises a compulsory government
pool may prove to be the most useful marketing mechanism.
Royal Grain Inquiry Commission, 1938, p. 159.
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During times of a lesser crises, such as a depression, the
open market, operating in conjunction with a floor price
provided through some degree of government intervention, would
likely be acceptable. During other times, the open market
system with the government involved only in a supervisory
capacity would, no doubt, lend itself best to a free enterprise
economy.
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A free open marketing, system was developed In Western
Canada to accommodate the expansion of wheat production in
that area during the latter part of the nineteenth and early
part of the twentieth centuries. Several grain trading and
milling companies were formed which built systems of elevators
as the need for these facilities became apparent. In 1887
the various companies and Individuals associated with the
grain trade established a trading center at Winnipeg. This
institution, the Winnipeg Grain Exchange, became increasingly
useful as domestic and export trade developed. The average
annual production for the period 1910-1914 was 196 million
bushels of which approximately 50 percent was exported. Av-
erage annual production increased to 254 million bushels in
the period 1915-1919 of which 63 percent was exported.
Canada was recognized as an important source of wheat by
the Allied nations during World War I and to direct the supply
into the desired channels and agency of the Allied powers,
the Grain Export Company became active in the Winnipeg market
in 1916. The heavy purchases of this organization caused a
severe disturbance in the market in 1917 with the result
that the Canadian Government closed the Winnipeg Grain Ex-
change and purchased all the domestic wheat production for
the duration of the war at a price fixed annually.
The Winnipeg Grain Exchange was permitted to reopen In
the summer of 1919. The very short wheat crop (92 million
bushels) which was harvested in that crop year suggested
that the price would become very high. To prevent the un-
favorable effects which would result therefrom, the Government
established the Canadian Wheat Board to act not only as a pur-
chasing agent but as the sole marketing agency. A price of
$2.63 per bushel was returned to the farmer for wheat de-
liveries in 1919-1920. The Board was abandoned at the end of
the crop year.
The recovery of wheat production throughout the world
in the years Immediately following was considered an important
reason for the decline in price which took place from 1920 to
1923. Most farm organizations, however, subscribed to the
opinion that the Government sponsored Wheat Board was respon-
sible for the high prices in the one period and the free open
market responsible for the low prices in the later period.
When agitation for the restoration of the Board proved unavail-
ing, attention was turned to the organization of cooperative
pools.
A Wheat Pool was incorporated in each of the three
Prairie Provinces during 1923 and 1924 and a Central Selling
Agency was established to dispose of wheat for all three pools
in the latter year. Approximately 50 percent of the wheat
crop was marketed through this system in each of the crop years
from 1924 to 1929. Evidence exists that the Wheat Pools con-
sidered themselves strong enough to Influence the world price
of wheat by withholding supplies from the market. ¥<ith this ob-
jective in mind a substantial portion of the Pool holdings of
the 1928 crop and practically all of the deliveries to the
Pool from the 1929 crop were retained in spite of falling
prices in the latter year. When the banks from which the Pools
had received their credit realized that the grain held had a
market value of les3 than the amount loaned they called for
some action. The Provincial Governments guaranteed the debt
but as the situation became more precarious in 1930 the Fed-
eral Government was resorted to for help. What were known as
"stabilization operations" were carried out for the next five
years. The Central Selling Agency was taken over by the Fed-
eral Government and the responsibility for any further loss
on the wheat held wa3 transferred to the Treasury. The rapid
decline in the price of wheat resulted in the disappearance
of speculators and the market became disorganized. The newly
appointed chairman of the Central Selling Agency received
Government aid for the purchase and sale of futures in an ef-
fort to restore confidence in the market and stability in the
price of wheat. As a result the. price of Canadian wheat was
maintained at an artificially high level with a consequent
severe decline in sales on the export market.
In 1955 the "stabilization operations' were discontinued
and a new Canadian V/heat Board was formed. The new Board pro-
vided an alternate market to the private grain companies and
was prepared to accept deliveries of wheat from producers at
a price fixed annually t when the open markot price declined
below that fixed level. The Board would offer to sell imme-
diately, purchases as they were made, at the open market
price. It was al3o the Intention to dispose of the wheat
accumulated during the stabilization period.
Durinc the next four years, 1935 to 1938, the Board lost
some $72 million dollars on its operations.
With the outbreak of war in 1939 European markets were
closed to a considerable extent and large stocks of wheat
accumulated.
In 1943 significant changes were made in the wheat market-
policy. The Winnipeg Grain Exchange was closed and the
Wheat Board on behalf of the Government purchased all wheat
in commercial position in Canada. The Board, from that date
forward, was the only market for wheat. Large bulk sales of
wheat were made at that tine to foreign countries and Govern-
ment requirements for the newly initiated Mutual aid program
were large. It is likely that the Government wished to pre-
vent the rise In price which might have accompanied these sales
since It would have Increased the cost of wheat for domestic
use, and Increased the cost of the Mutual Aid program. It has
been suggested that the changed marketing policy placed the
Government in a strategic position to formulate a post-war
wheat policy.
This policy later proved to bo a five year compulsory pool
extending from 1945 to the end of the 1949 crop year. A minimum
price of Si.00 per bushel was guaranteed to the farmers.
As a means of disposing of the pooled wheat the Government
was prepared to negotiate lon._ term agreements. One such
agreement was arranged whereby Canada agreed to supply the
United Kin dom with 600 million bushels of wheat at a minimum
price fixed in advance. In this way the Government was able to
reduce the risk Involved in its promise of a $1.00 per bushel
floor price. The wheat marketed in excess of that Involved
in the Agreement was sold in domestic and foreign markets by
the Canadian wheat Board.
The five year pool and the Canada-United Kingdom Agree-
ment have been the subject of considerable controversy, it hav-
ing been contended that the farmers l03t heavily under the
system. The Government has defended the system on the grounds
that reduced prices for wheat have saved an export market for
Canada, both at the present time of dollar shcrtace, and for
the future. The point has also been made that the stability
of price has been worth more to the producer than a fluctuat-
ing prioe which might have resulted in a greater total revenue.
The main defence of the five year pool offered by the
Government was associated with the abnormality of the post-war
period when dollar exchange was very scarce In the traditional
markets for Canadian wheat. With the correction of that diffi-
culty the main justification for state trading would dis-
appear. It was also suggested that a return to private trading
in the importing countries would make state trading in Canada
undesirable, 3ince private traders distrust monopoly and would
not be anxious to contribute to its success. Private traders
like the opan market system and since Canada is highly de-
pendent on export sales It would seem desirable to accommodate
the private trader in thi3 respect.
The open market system, while facilitating export trade
in wheat may not offer a desirable degree of price stability
or a sufficiently high price level. Voluntary pooling on a
modest scalo would provide an average price in any crop year
and would therefore bo a useful addition to an open market
system. A aoverrment supported floor price would also add
stability but if the charge on the Treasury were excessive
the system would become politically unacceptable. Evidence
of this was noted in the period 1935 to 1939. However, if
wheat producers were prepared to accept a tax on receipts in
excess of the floor level, the revenue of which should be
used to offset losses suffered when the market price declined
below the floor level, the system might prove workable.
In concluding it was pointed out that the marketing sys-
tem might have to be changed to meet changing world condi-
tions. In time of crisis a Government controlled marketing
system may prove most useful while at other times the open
market system seemed to have the most to recommend it.
